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I. CONTRACTOR CASUALTIES-THE HIDDEN COST OF WAR 
A. Introduction 
Osama Bin Laden's death gave the United States leverage in the war 
against AI Qaeda, and some members of Congress are now calling for a 
troop withdrawal and an end to military operations in Afghanistan. 1 How-
ever, the U.S. invasion of Iraq offers sound evidence that even if such an 
order was given, the U.S. military, along with thousands of civilian contrac-
tors, would remain in Mghanistan for some time.2 Long after the toppling of 
Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, U.S. troops and civilian contractors re-
mained in Iraq to begin rebuilding infrastructure decimated by years of 
war.3 Now, twelve years later, the rebuilding of Iraq continues.4 Similar re-
building efforts in Afghanistan are already underway and will likely continue 
well into the future. 5 
Regardless of when U.S. soldiers withdraw from the Middle East, senior 
military officials have pledged their support to these veterans.6 Many injured 
soldiers have been kept alive by improvements in Kevlar vests and other life-
saving equipment but are returning to the United States with permanent dis-
abling injuries.7 Other returning soldiers are suffering from mental health 
disorders and pose a higher suicide risk, a problem that has plagued the mil-
itary during times oflengthy and repeated troop deployments.8 Fortunately, 
universal, government-provided health care for military members allows 
wounded warriors to be treated by world-class physicians and health care 
I. See Siobhan Hughes, 27 Senators Call for Sizable Troop Withdrawal front Afghanistan, WALL 
ST.)' Gune IS, 2011), http://online.wsj.com!article/BT-CO-20110615-712044.htrnl. 
2. See Iraq at War, N.Y. TIMES Gan. 16, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com!top/news/interna 
tionallcountriesandterritories/iraq/index.htrnl. 
3. See id. 
4. See id. 
5. See Afghanistan at War, N.Y. TIMES Gan. 12, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com!top/news/ 
internationallcountriesandterritories/afghanistanlindex.htrnl. 
6. See Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Remarks at the 93rd Annual 
Conference of the American Legion (Aug. 30, 2011). 
7. See, e.g., Dan Froomkin, How Many U.S. Soldiers Were Wounded in Iraq? Guess Again, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 30, 2011, 10:20 AM), http://www.huffingronpost.com!dan-froomkinl 
iraq-soldiers-wounded_b_1176276.htrnl;Jon Schwartz & Edward Iwata, Irrvented to Save Gas, Kev-
far Saves Lives, USA TODAY (Apr. 17, 2003), http://www.usatoday.com!money/worldliraq/2003-
04-15-kevlar_x.htrn#. 
8. Charles W. Hoge et ai., Combat Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mental Health Problems, and 
Barriers to Care, 351 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 13, 14 (2004); see generally Jeffrey Hyman et ai., Suicide 
Incidence and Risk Factors in an Active Duty United States Military Population, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
(forthcoming Mar. 2012). 
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practitioners.9 There is, however, a much lesser-known contingent of men 
and women working overseas in support of their military brethren who are 
not as celebrated or as fortunate. They are America's contractor veterans, 
and they too have suffered injuries of war. 
Deployed contractors are returning home in record numbers with many of 
the same injuries and health issues facing soldiers. Working alongside the mil-
itary, often in dangerous security roles, contractor veterans are showing signs 
of post-traumatic stress and other mental health disorders commonly found 
only in soldiers exposed to combat. 10 While a number of government agencies 
are tasked with treating both active-duty and veteran soldiers, those same sup-
port networks are largely absent for contractors. II Regrettably, this issue has 
largely been ignored, even as contractors and military members increasingly 
share the same battle space. This ignorance is partly due to an insolent 
group of Americans who believe contractors are essentially expendable. 12 
They believe that the greatest benefit contractors provide to the Government 
is the expiration of their contract. 13 Injured contractors, however, have 
recently been able to voice their concerns to members of Congress, and gov-
ernment officials are now beginning to debate the potentially broad and long-
term consequences of discounting these contractor veterans. 14 
The issue parallels the national health care debate. The cost of treating 
the uninsured or underinsured in emergency rooms has caused health care 
costs to skyrocket, but solutions for increased coverage are costly and polit-
ically contentious. IS Healthy Americans are arguably more productive, con-
sume less health care resources, and are less burdensome on the economy, 
but opponents of universal health care argue that the Government cannot 
afford health care for all Americans. 16 The debate touches on the fundamen-
tal question of whether the Government has some kind of moral obligation 
to care for those who cannot care for themselves. One might expect less of a 
debate on the issue of whether the Government has an obligation to help 
contractor veterans returning from war, as these Americans certainly draw 
more sympathy from politicians. Much like the national health care debate, 
9. See About the VHA, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., http://www.va.govlhealthiaboutVHA. 
asp (last visited Mar. I, 2012). 
10. See James Risen, Bock from Iraq, Contractors Face Combat Related Stress, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 
2007, at AI. 
II. Id. 
12. David Ivanovich, Moneymakers: Contracting Expen Zeros in on Iraq: Five Questions with Ste-
ven Schooner, Hous. CHRONICLE (Feb. 29, 2008), http://www.chron.comldefaultiarticle/Money 
makers-Contracting-expert-zeroes-in-on-Iraq-I 65 045 5 .php. 
13. Id. 
14. See After Injury, the Bottle Begins: Evaluating Workers' Compensation for Civilian Contractors 
in War Zones: Hearing Before the H. Comm. an Oversight and Gov't Reform, III th Congo 9 (2009) 
[hereinafter 2009 House Hearing]. 
IS. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010). 
16. Joe Messerli, Should the Government Provide Free Universal Health Core for All Americam?, 
BALANCEDPOLITICS, http://www.balancedpolitics.org/universal_health_care.htm (last visited 
Mar. I, 2012). 
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however, Congress has been steadfastly focused on the rising cost of the 
insurance that contractors use to protect their employees.17 
Rather than limiting reform efforts to fiscal matters, this Article calls upon 
Congress to capitalize on the opportunity to correct substantive issues plagu-
ing the Defense Base Act (DBA)18 insurance system. Congress recently 
passed legislation requiring the secretary of defense to adopt a new acquisi-
tion strategy for insurance required by the DBA. 19 While cost should be a 
consideration of any new strategy for securing DBA insurance, Congress 
must consider salient noncost-related benefits when weighing the merits of 
various strategies. Injured contractors returning from Iraq and Mghanistan 
are being denied reimbursement for medical treatment by their DBA insur-
ance carriers.2o The problem is occurring with even more frequency when 
claims are filed by contractors who suffer from mental illness related to com-
bat stress.21 Members of Congress have a duty and an obligation to support 
contractor veterans and their families, and they must fulfill that obligation 
when they choose a new DBA acquisition strategy. 
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I describes the problems encoun-
tered by injured contractors as they return from war. Part II discusses how the 
regulatory scheme for insuring contractors contributes to the problems experi-
enced by contractors. Part III offers practical suggestions for Congress and the 
Department of Defense (DoD) as they prepare to adopt a new DBA acquisition 
strategy. Finally, Part IV asserts that the current open-market insurance strategy 
is inadequate and argues that Congress should implement a multiple-provider 
system for DBA insurance. In the short term, a multiple-provider strategy 
best addresses DBA insurance costs and claims processing concerns and can 
be implemented swiftly and without extensive changes to the law. In addition, 
Congress should begin taking steps to implement government self-insurance, 
which offers even greater savings and benefits for injured contractors. 
B. Contractor Death Toll Exceeds That of u.s. Military in Iraq and Afkhanistan 
While the efforts of the men and women in uniform are often publicly 
lauded, contractor contributions are frequently overlooked. Americans are 
well aware of the service members whose lives have been lost in Iraq and 
Mghanistan but are well insulated from the contractor death toll. Contract-
ing is the primary means by which the U.S. military is able to complete its 
mission without exceeding the personnel limitations imposed by Congress.22 
The current wars would not be sustainable relying on the military alone. 
17. See 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14, at 10. 
18. Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.c. §§ 1651-54 (2006). 
19. See Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 110-417, §843, 122 Stat. 4502, 4540 (2008). 
20. 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14, at 2. 
21. See id. at 183. 
22. See Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 
111-383, §401, 124 Stat. 4137, 4202. 
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The military's increased reliance on contractors in recent wars has raised 
new issues regarding the treatment of injured contractors returning from 
overseas. Contractors have historically been used to supplement the military 
by performing tasks that are not "inherently governmental."23 The line 
between what is and is not inherently governmental, however, is becoming 
increasingly blurred. Examples of not "inherently governmental" functions 
include providing support services to a military base, such as maintaining 
the grounds, operating the dining facilities, and performing laundry ser-
vices.24 In addition to these traditional "not inherently governmental ser-
vices," however, DoD contractors also provide security detail services, 
such as those provided by Xe Services, formerly Blackwater Worldwide. 25 
As of March 2011, base support and security services made up about eighty 
percent of the work performed by DoD contractors in Iraq.26 Consequently, 
as military resources are stretched thin by lengthy military operations on two 
fronts, the distinction between what is and is not inherently governmental 
has become rather opaque. Further, due to the number of contractors work-
ing in hazardous duty 10cations,27 the risk to these contractors has increased 
dramatically. Now, the issue for the Government is how to manage the re-
turning contractor workforce, which often suffers from many of the same 
physical and mental maladies as military veterans. 
Professor Steven L. Schooner has written extensively on the topic of con-
tractor fatalities. 28 His articles have unveiled shocking statistics and brought 
much-needed attention to the dangers contractors face as they risk their lives 
to support the military. Between January and June 2010, more military con-
tractors than uniformed service members were killed in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.29 There were reportedly 250 contractor deaths and 235 military deaths 
23. See FAR 7.5. Inherently governmental refers to employment functions that are typically 
performed by military or federal civilian employees rather than contract or employees. 
24. See MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., R40764, DoD CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ & 
AFGHANISTAN: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 15 (2011). 
25. See generally Mark Mazzetti & Emily B. Hager, Secret Desert Force Setup by Blackwater's 
Founder, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.coml20 11105/15/world/middleeastl 
15 prince.html?ref=blackwaterusa. 
26. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at 15. 
27. See Steven L. Schooner, Wby Contractor Fatalities Matter, 38(3) PARAMETERS 78, 78 (2008). 
28. Steven L. Schooner is co-director of the Government Procurement Law Program at The 
George Washington University Law School and the Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government 
Contract Law. His most recent publications on government contractor fatalities include the fol-
lowing: id.; Steven L. Schooner & Collin D. Swan, Contractors and the Ultimate Sacrifice, SERVo 
CONTRACTOR., Sept. 2010, at 16 [hereinafter Schooner & Swan, Contractors & the Ultimate Sac-
rifice]; Steven L. Schooner & Collin D. Swan, Dead Contractors: The Un-examined Effect of Sur-
rogates on the Public's Casualty Sensitivity, J. NAT'L SEC. LAW & POL'y (forthcoming 2012) [here-
inafter Schooner & Swan, Dead Contractors]. 
29. See Rogene Fisher Jacquette, Contractor Deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan Outnumber Service 
Member Deaths, N.Y. TIMES BLOG: AT WAR: NOTES FRO'" THE FRONTLII\'ES (Sept. 23, 2010, 2:27 
PM), http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.coml20 1 010912 31 con tractor-dea ths-in -iraq-and -afghanistan-out 
number-service-member-deaths/?scp= 1 &sq=contractor%20deaths%2 Ooumumber&st=cse. 
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during the six-month period.30 Even more startling is that three times as 
many contractor injuries have been reported than military injuries since 
the beginning of operations in Iraq in 200Pl These statistics reflect an 
upward trend in contingency contracting casualties, and the contractor 
death toll is increasing exponentially compared to military fatalities. Between 
2003 and 2010, contractor deaths rose from five percent of the annual death 
toll to more than fifty percent. 32 As of March 2011, there were approxi-
mately 155,000 private contractors employed by the DoD in Iraq and 
Afghanistan compared to approximately 145,000 uniformed personnel.33 
Most surprisingly, contractors currently account for approximately fifty-
two percent of the workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan34 and on average 
have outnumbered military personnel in Afghanistan for the last two 
years. 35 This support has undoubtedly contributed to the success of the mil-
itary, but the reliance on contractors has come at a cost. 
Professor Schooner's articles have brought much-needed transparency to 
a quiet corner of government contracting. Policymakers and legislatures, as 
well as the general public, have ignored the risks to contractors and have 
hardly raised an eyebrow at the staggering trend in contractor fatalities. 36 
But perhaps equally as troubling is the trend in contractor injuries, which 
may have even further-reaching consequences. Few organizations have 
tracked injuries sustained by contractor veterans, and even fewer have advo-
cated for contractors or provided support for their injuries.37 Insurance com-
panies have predominantly been responsible for employee injuries, but this 
has only resulted in increased profits for carriers and excessive denial of 
claims for injured workers.38 Given the limited number of remedies under 
the current regulatory scheme, the Government has not been able to limit 
costs or provide greater care for contractors. Thus, while contractors are 
dying in record numbers, insurance carriers are seeing unprecedented in-
creases in revenue and profit.39 
30. /d. 
31. See Schooner & Swan, Contractors & the Ultimate Sacrifice, supra note 28, at 16, 17. 
32. Id. at 17. 
33. SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at 6. The number of contractor and military personnel in Iraq 
and Mghanistan has decreased from approximately 207,600 contractors and 175,000 military in 
March 2010. MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONGo REsEARCH SERV., R40764, DoD CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ & 
AFGHANISTAN: BACKGROUND & ANALYSIS 5 (2010). 
34. SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at Summary. 
35. See James Glanz, Contractors Outnumbe:r U.S. Troops in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.coml2009/09/02/woridiasial02contractors.html. 
36. See Schooner & Swan, Contractors & the Ultimate Sacrifice, supra note 28, at 18. 
37. /d. 
38. See infra Part liLA. 
39. See Schooner, supra note 27, at 78; OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SEC'y OF DEF. ACQUISI. 
TION & TECH., DEP'T OF DEF., ACQUIsmON STRATEGY FOR DEF. BASE Acr INSURANCE, REpORT 
TO CONGRESS i, available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpf/docs/acq_strategy_defense_ 
base_accinsurance.pdf [herinafter DoD REPORT TO CONGRESS]. 
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C. Contractor Veterans Encounter Difficulties After Overseas Employment 
The miracle of Kevlar has helped keep many contractors alive.4o But, after 
sustaining traumatic injuries overseas, injured contractors are faced with new 
challenges at home.41 In most cases, family members are able to help manage 
their loved ones' illnesses, but filing claims for medical expenses and dealing 
with insurance carriers can be a herculean task.42 Due to the complex nature 
of mental health claims, such as those related to post-traumatic stress disor-
der (PTSD) and traumatic brain injury (rBI), the claims process for these 
cases can be quite contentious.43 In fact, insurance carriers deny close to 
half of all PTSD claims.44 For contractors and their families, the process 
of appealing the denial of their claims, in addition to managing the symp-
toms of their illnesses, is overwhelming. 
Even more disturbing is that these illnesses are not well-documented. The 
DoD did not even begin tracking data on contractors in Iraq and Mghanistan 
until the latter half of 2007.45 It was not until 2008 that the DoD signed an 
agreement to use the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker 
(SPOT) system, a system designed to track contractor casualties.46 Before 
2007, the most accurate tally of contractor casualties was tracked by the 
Department of Labor's (DOL) Division of Longshore and Harbor Worker 
Compensation, which tracks insurance claims submitted by the family or 
employer of an injured or dead contractor.47 These statistics provide critical 
quantitative data, which can be used to estimate the actual cost of DoD op-
erations, since the DoD has historically failed to account for contractor op-
erations.48 While the implementation of SPOT has assisted the Government 
in tracking contractor casualties, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) and the DoD concede that SPOT is still an inadequate source of 
data.49 
Current research tracking the mental health of contractors employed in 
war zones is even scarcer. Studies conducted on military populations suggest 
that contractors working in war zones are probably suffering from the same 
mental health disorders as military soldiers. 50 According to Dr. Matthew 
Friedman, a Veterans Affairs official who heads the National Center for 
40. Schooner & Swan, Dead Contractors, supra note 28, at 14 (citing Atul Gawande, Casualties 
of War-Military Care for the Woundedfrom Iraq and Afghanistan, 351 NEW ENGL.]. MED. 2471, 
2474 (2004), available at http://www.nejrn.org/doilfuIlIl0.10561NE]Mp048317). 
41. See Wounded Civilian Workers Fightfor Care, CBSNEW5.COM Gul. 27, 2009,1:17 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.comlstoriesl2 009/041 17 InationaVrnain49 51906.shtml?tag=contentMain; 
contentBody. 
42. See id. 
43. See id. 
44. !d. 
45. SCHWARTZ, supra note 33, at 4. 
46. Id. at 5. 
47. See Schooner, supra note 27, at 86. 
48. See Schooner & Swan, Dead Contractors, supra note 28, at 19-20. 
49. See id. at 17; SCHWARTZ, supra note 33, at 5. 
50. See Risen, supra note 10. 
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Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, the issue of mental illness in contractors has 
never been reviewed by the Government. 51 Only recently have significant 
mental health studies on military soldiers in Iraq and Mghanistan been 
undertaken. These studies have found that psychological disorders may be 
disproportionately high when compared with physical injuries from the 
two wars. 52 The studies also show that psychological disorders in the mili-
tary community are often left untreated. 53 In its 2008 study, the RAND Cor-
poration found that between five and fifteen percent of deployed service 
members are affected by PTSD.54 Another two to fourteen percent meet 
the diagnostic criteria for major depression. 55 Of the soldiers who screened 
positive for a mental health condition, the study found that only one-third 
sought mental health support while deployed.56 About the same number 
of soldiers who met screening criteria for a mental health illness received 
mental health support upon their return from deployment. 57 
The application of these findings to the contractor community reveals a 
disturbing picture. Contractor fatalities recently surpassed military fatal-
ities,58 suggesting contractors are being exposed to many of the same hazards 
as military members. Given this statistic, it is reasonable to conclude that 
there may be a large number of U.S. contractors who are in need of mental 
health treatment. This exposure likely includes many second- and third-tier 
subcontractors who are not as savvy or sophisticated as prime contractors 
and are even less likely to utilize DBA benefits. 
One contractor found that a significant percentage of his employees were 
not receiving needed mental health care.59 Paul Brand, a psychologist and 
chief executive officer of the firm Mission Critical Psychological Services 
(MCPS), L.L.C.,60 independently conducted a study on contractors' mental 
health while working at DynCorp, the Department of State's (DOS) largest 
51. See id. 
52. RAND CORP., INVISIBLE WOUNDS OF WAR: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE INJURIES, 
THEIR CONSEQUENCES, AND SERVICES TO AsSIST RECOVERY iii (ferri Tanielian & Lisa H. 
Jaycox, eds., 2008), available at http://www.rand.org/contentldamlrandlpubslmonographsl2008/ 
RAND _MG720.pdf. 
53. Id. at 251. 
54. Id. at 250. 
55. !d. 
56. !d. at 251. 
57. !d. 
58. See Jacquette, supra note 29. 
59. See T. Christian Miller, The Other Victims of Battlefield Stress; Defense Contractors' Mental 
Health Neglected, PROPUBLlCA.ORG (Feb. 26, 2010, 2:48 AM), http://www.propublica.org/ 
article/injured-contractors-the-other-victims-of-battlefieId-stress-224. 
60. Paul Brand, Ph.D., founded MCPS to offer psychological screening and services for peo-
ple working in war-torn areas. About Us, MISSION CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVS., LLC, http:// 
www.missioncriticalpsych.comlsite/epage/64926_765.httn (last visited Mar. 3, 2011). Before 
starting MCPS, as the president of Medina & Thompson, Inc., Dr. Brand developed psycholog-
ical fitness programs to support police officers sent to Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Israel, Liberia, and 
East Timor as part of peacekeeping initiatives. !d. Dr. Brand also helped DynCorp International, 
the Department of State's largest contractor, become the first company with comprehensive psy-
chological support for its employees serving in Iraq and Mghanistan. Id. Dr. Brand holds his 
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contractor. He found that twenty-four percent of contract employees from 
DynCorp had symptoms of PTSD or depression after their overseas employ-
ment.61 He also found that many of the contractors had never received mental 
health screening and were not receiving treatment for their symptoms.62 Based 
on his study, he estimated that thousands more contractors employed by other 
firms were probably not being screened or receiving treatment of any type.63 
The importance of these findings lies in the relationship between mental 
health and suicide. Researchers have long believed that mental health and suicide 
are closely related. 64 As senior military officials struggle to balance troop deploy-
ments with fluctuating financial constraints, they remain highly cognizant of the 
long-standing concern about suicide among military personne1.65 Studies show 
that the majority of persons who have committed suicide suffered from at least 
one mental disorder.66 Reducing suicide incidents, which is experiencing re-
newed importance in the military, is therefore dependent upon obtaining treat-
ment for soldiers and contractors who are in need of mental health care. 
The fast-paced operations tempo and the duration of recent wars have 
caused a rise in suicide among military personnel, a situation that has caught 
the 000 by surprise.67 Between 2005 and 2009, 1,100 military members 
took their lives-the equivalent of one member every thirty-six hours.68 
The suicide rate in all services has increased since 2001, but the rate in 
the Army has more than doubled.69 Among Army personnel, the suicide 
rate has exceeded that of the civilian population since 2005.70 The rising sui-
cide rates shocked military leaders and congressional leaders to such an 
extent that when Congress passed the Duncan Hunter National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (NDAA for 2009), they directed 
the secretary of defense to establish a task force to examine matters related 
to suicide prevention in the armed forces. 71 The secretary of defense 
submitted the task force's detailed suicide report to the Committees on 
Ph.D. in psychology from the Illinois Institute of Technology and has lived and worked in Ko-
sovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, as well as the United States. Id. 
61. Miller, supra note 59. As previously mentioned, RAND Corp. reported that five to fifteen 
percent of military members reported symptoms of PTSD and two to fourteen percent met the 
criteria for major depression. See RAND CORP., supra note 52, at 250. These statistics suggest that 
perhaps a higher percentage of contractors are suffering from mental health problems than mil-
itary members. 
62. Miller, supra note 59. 
63. Id. 
64. See RAND CORP., supra note 52, at 12S. 
65. See id. 
66. /d. 
67. DoD TASK FORCE ON THE PREVENTION OF SUICIDE BY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, 
THE CHALLENGE AND THE PROMISE: STRENGTHENING THE FORCE, PREVENTING SUICIDE AND SAV-
ING LIVES 107 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.health.mil/dhb/downloads/Suicide%20 
Prevention%20Task%20Force%20report%200S-21-10_V4_RLN.pdf. 
6S. Id. at ES-1. 
69. Id. at ES-I-ES-2. 
70. Id. at 17. 
71. See Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 110-417, § 733,122 Stat. 4502, 4540 (200S). 
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Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives in August 
2010.72 They made forty-nine findings and seventy-six recommendations 
across four focus areas. 73 While the task force found that military policy 
on the delivery of mental health care to the armed forces is well-intended, 
it concluded that the system is unorganized and lacking in mental health pro-
fessionals and other necessary resources. 74 
The renewed focus on mental health in the military is a positive sign that 
the DoD is finally addressing this critical need of its warfighters. The focus 
will undoubtedly improve the overall effectiveness of the u.S. military. 
None of the strategies cited in the DoD study and almost none of the DoD's re-
sources, however, will be dedicated to helping U.S. contractors in their fight against 
mental illness. Contractors working alongside the U.S. military are experienc-
ing combat stress and battle fatigue but are off the radar and out of the scope 
of DoD officials.75 Unlike for the military, there is no official support 
network in place to help injured contractors cope with the stress of their in-
juries or navigate the medical claims process.76 Without the necessary sup-
port and resources, contractors are left to fight the symptoms of their ill-
nesses on their own. 77 
72. DoD TASK FORCE ON THE PREVENTION OF SUICIDE BY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, 
supra note 67, at A-3. 
73. Id. at v. 
74. Id. at ES-2, ES-6. 
75. See Miller, supra note 59. 
76. Advocacy or support for wounded contractors has been limited to volunteer providers. 
Jana Crowder, who operates a website, Civilian Contractors in Iraq and Mghanistan, http:// 
www.americancontractorsiniraq.coml. dedicated to injured contractors, is one such provider. 
She is the organizer of a Tennessee support group for injured contractors and, though not a 
health professional, has helped injured contractor veterans returning from Iraq. See Day to 
Day: Iraq Contractors Convene in Tennessee, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 12, 2007), http://www.npr. 
org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 7364190. 
77. Beginning in 2007, three media outlets, The Los Angeles Times, ABC News, and Pro-
Publica, began reporting on the tribulations of injured contractors returning from Iraq and 
Mghanistan. See Day to Day: Iraq Contractors Convene in Tennessee, supra note 76. The stories 
of these injured contractors are disturbing. One contractor, Preston Wheeler, was a truck driver 
employed by Kellog, Brown, and Root (KBR) in Iraq who witnessed the murder of his co-
worker in 2005. Id. It took Mr. Preston two years to find a support group in which he could 
begin to confront his emotional problems. Id. Another KBR employee, Robert Rho, was also 
injured in Iraq and fought with his insurance carrier over benefits for years after his return. 
Id. A third KBR contractor had to bring his case to the attention of Tennessee Senator 
Lamar Alexander before receiving his DBA entitlements. See id. However, the most horrific 
example of exploiting contractor veterans and their families is the case of Wade Dill. See 
T. Christian Miller, The War's Quiet Scandal, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.thedaily 
beast.comlblogs-and-storiesI2010-02-25/the-wars-quiet-scandaVfull. Mr. Dill accepted a job in 
Mghanistan performing pest extermination services to help pay for his daughter'S college edu-
cation. Id. On one occasion, Mr. Dill was called to clean up the remains of a young soldier who 
had shot himself in the head. Id. The task had such a profound and disabling effect on Mr. Dill 
that eventually Mr. Dill quit his job and separated from his wife. /d. On July 16,2006, Mr. Dill 
was found dead in a local hotel room a few miles from their home. [d. He left a note that read, 
"I did exist and I loved you." [d. His wife, Barbara Dill, filed a claim with KBR's insurance pro-
vider, AIG, claiming her husband's death was a result of PTSD brought on by his employment 
in Iraq. /d. Her expert witness, Dr. Seaman, who specialized in PTSD, concluded that U[t)he 
bottom line is that the combination of physical separation and work-related stress resulted in 
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II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME 
A. The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 
the Deftnse Base Act, and the War Hazard Compensation Act 
Congress is now debating alternatives to the regulatory scheme that pro-
tects contractors overseas,78 but the merits of these alternatives must be 
weighed against current regulations. The Government provides workers' 
compensation benefits to various categories of employees who perform 
work for the Government.79 In some cases, the Government provides 
these benefits directly, with funds appropriated by Congress.80 In other 
cases, the Government mandates that contractors provide these benefits to 
their employees.81 Benefits are generally distributed based on one of four 
employee types: military, civil service, nonappropriated fund instrumentality 
(NFI), and contractor employees.82 
All members of the U.S. military are eligible to receive pay and benefits, 
including pay and benefits for injuries, medical expenses, and life insurance 
coverage.83 Almost any injury or death of a military member while in active 
status entitles the member to benefits, regardless of whether the member was 
performing military duties when he or she was injured or killed.84 Funding 
for military benefits is provided through congressional appropriations to the 
DoD, which oversees the Military Health System (MHS).85 
Civilian employees, or "civil servants," are directly employed by the Gov-
ernment and receive compensation for work-related injuries under Title 5, 
Chapter 81, of the United States Code.86 The Federal Employees' Compen-
sation Act (FECA) provides funding for the benefits received by civil servants 
increasingly emotional distance, greater distortion of the relationship, increasing emotional 
intensity, and a pattern of increasing erratic behaviors that culminated in suicide .... " Id. How-
ever, the expert for AIG believed the illness was caused by marital and family problems and be-
lieved it was unrelated to the stresses of his employment in Iraq. !d. The DOL recommended 
that AIG pay the claim, but AIG refused. Id. Ms. Dill's only recourse was to file an appeal 
through DOL's dispute resolution system, a process that took months to complete. !d. She 
eventually won her appeal in 2011, five years after her husband's death. See Dill v. Servo 
Emps. Int'l, Inc., Case No. 2008-LDA-00259, at 43-44 (Dep't of Labor Jan. 21, 2011), available 
at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/Decisions/ ALJlLDAl2008IDILL_Barbara WID _v _SERVICE_EM 
PLOYEES_IN_2008LDA002 59_ % 28JAN_2 1_20 II %29 _I 34436_CADECSD.pdf. 
78. See 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14, at 19 (2009) (statement of Seth D. Harris, Deputy 
Sec'y, Dep't of Labor). 
79. See History of owep, u.s. DEP'T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PRO· 
GRM1S, http://www.dol.gov/owcp/owcphist.htrn (last visited Jan. 14, 2012) (discussing various 
workers' compensation programs administered by the Federal Government). 
80. See, e.g., Federal Employees Workers' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.c. § 8102(a) (2006). 
81. See, e.g., Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.c. § 904 (2006). 
82. See 5 U.S.c. §8101 (2006) (civil service); 5 U.S.C. §8171(a) (2006) (NFl); 42 U.S.c. 
§ 1651(a) (2006) (military and contractor employees). 
83. See 10 U.s.c. § 1074(a)(I) (2006). 
84. See id. § 1074(a)(2). 
85. See RICHARD A. BEST JR., CONGo RESEARCH SERV., IB931 03, MILITARY MEDICAL CARE SER-
VICES: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS CRS-2 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/miscl 
IB931 03. pdf. 
86. See Compensation for Work Injuries,S U.S.c. §§ 8101-8152 (2006). 
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covered by the statute.87 The benefits are comprehensive and cover compen-
sation for disability and death of employees,88 death gratuities for injuries in 
connection with an employee's service with an armed force,89 and medical 
services. 
Compensation for injuries or death for NFl employees and contractors 
is not directly paid for by appropriated funds. Rather, through various 
amendments, Congress has directed that NFls and contractors provide ben-
efits granted under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 
(LHWCA) to their employees.9o The LHWCA was enacted in 1927 and is 
administered by the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP), 
. under the DOL.91 As the title of the statute suggests, the LHWCA was orig-
inally intended to provide compensation for the disability or death of a mar-
itime employee if the disability or death arose from an injury occurring upon 
the navigable waters of the United States.92 Through various amendments, 
however, Congress has expanded the LHWCA to provide coverage to work-
ers engaged in a wide range of public works projects,93 The statute requires 
employers to provide coverage for qualifYing employees who are performing 
work for the Government in certain areas.94 
The LHWCA contains benefits for many specific contingencies. Benefits 
include medical services, supplies, and even choice of physician.95 The stat-
ute also provides for disability and death benefits, depending on whether an 
injury is permanent or temporary and whether the worker is partially or 
totally disabled.96 Typically, injured workers receive two-thirds of their aver-
age weekly wages for the duration of their disability.97 Congress has used the 
LHWCA as the basic framework for providing workers' compensation ben-
efits to government workers who are not directly employed by the Govern-
ment, such as NFl employees.98 
87. This U.S. Treasury fund is a collection point for appropriations made by Congress for the 
purpose of paying compensation and other benefits and expenses to eligible federal employees. 
See Division of Federal Employee's Compensation (DFEC): Procedure Manual, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dfedprocedure-manual.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2012). 
88. 5 U.S.c. § 8102 (2006). 
89. 5 U.S.c. § 8 102 (a) (Supp. II 2009). 
90. See Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.c. §§ 901-950 (2006). 
91. Division of Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation (DLHWC): Pamphlet LS-560, U.S. 
DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwdLS-560pam.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2012). 
92. 33 U.S.c. § 903(a). 
93. 42 U.S.c. §§ 1651(a)(3), 1701(a) (2006). 
94. See 33 U.S.c. § 904(a). 
95. Id. § 907(a)-(b). 
96. Id. § 908. Specific injuries are listed with particularity in the statute, such as "Compensa-
tion for loss of more than one phalange of a digit shall be the same as for loss of the entire digit. 
Compensation for loss of the first phalange shall be one-half of the compensation for loss of the 
entire digit." /d. 
97. Id. 
98. See Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities Act, 5 U.S.c. § 8171 (2006) (applying 
LHWCA to NFl employees); 5 U.S.c. §2105(c) (2006) (describing NFl employees). DoD 
uses NFls to maintain morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs and facilities for the 
armed forces. Who Are NAP Employees?, CPMS.osD.MIL, http://www.cpms.osd.miIJASSETS/ 
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Workers' compensation for contractors operates much the same way. The 
DBA extends coverage under the LHWCA by requiring government con-
tractors to provide their employees with LHWCA benefits.99 The DBA 
was enacted in 1941 as a result of an almost tenfold increase in the use of 
civilian contractors between World War I and World War II.lOO The pur-
pose of the law was to clarify and limit the liability of the Government 
and defense contractors while ensuring the protection of civilian laborers.lOl 
Originally intended to cover only contractors working on military bases, the 
DBA has been amended a number of times to provide expanded coverage for 
contractors engaged in public work projects regardless of whether they work 
on a military base. 102 The law requires businesses to provide compensation 
in the event of injury or death to their employees working "at any military, 
air, or naval base ... or upon lands occupied or used by the United States ... 
or upon any public work ... outside the continental United States .... "103 
The term "public work" is broadly defined in the statute and includes "any 
project ... involving construction, alteration, removal or repair for the pub-
lic use of the United States or its allies ... including service contracts ... and 
ancillary work in connection therewith .... "104 Today, almost all U.S. 
contractors working on building projects outside the continental United 
States-such as dams, harbor improvements, roadways, and housing-are 
covered under the DBA.lOS 
87993068876A450DA03A6C76F6737D28IWho%20are%20NAF%20employees-ltem%200f 
%20Interest.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2012). NFls are generally operated by civilians who are em-
ployed by the armed forces "services" sector and include operating post exchanges, child day-
care centers, and indoor and outdoor recreation facilities under the jurisdiction of the armed 
forces. Id. Due to their support role, NFl employees are often co-located with deployed forces. 
Id. However, regardless of whether they are located inside or outside the continental United 
States, NFl employees are covered by the LHWCA for work-related injuries. See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 8171. The law that extends coverage under the LHWCA to NFl employees is the Nonappro-
priated Fund Instrumentalities Act (NFIA). Id. Under NFIA, benefits are paid for with revenues 
generated by the NFls rather than appropriated funds. See Johnson v. United States, 600 F.2d 
1218, 1221 (6th Cir. 1979); Who Are NAF Employees?, supra; James M. Mesnard, Exclusivity 
Under the Act, 6 Loy. MAR. L.]. 59, 59 (2008). 
99. See Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1651. 
100. Greta S. Milligan, The Defense Base Act: An Outdated Law and Its Current Implications, 86 
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407, 411 (2009) (85,000 civilians accompanied the military during 
World War I, as compared to 734,000 in World War II). 
101. 42 U.S.c. § 1651(a), (c) (2006). See generally Kerry]. Anzalone, The Defense Base Act-A 
Growth Industry?, Benefits Rev. Bd. Serv., Longshore Rptr. (MB) (2004), available at http://www. 
oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/LONGSHORE/REFERENCES/REFERENCE_ WORKS/THE_ 
DEFENSE_BASE_ACT(2004).HTM. 
102. See, e.g., War Hazards Compensation Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1701(a)(1)-(2) (2006). 
103. Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1651(a)(3). 
104. Id. § 1651(b)(1). In Casey v. Chapman College, 23 Ben. Rev. Bd. Servo (MB) 7, at 8, 10-11 
(1989), the Board held that a professor of Asian Studies who was injured on a U.S. naval base in 
Japan was covered under the DBA. The Board found that his employment teaching Asian studies 
in the Pacific to Navy personnel was related to national defense and therefore constituted the 
"public work" required for coverage. Id. 
lOS. See Anzalone, supra note 101, at 1. 
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Coverage under the DBA is monitored by the DOL, but the DOL does 
not secure insurance for contractors. 106 The DBA requires contractors to 
self-insure or purchase insurance with a provider of their choice. I07 The 
DOL generates a list of prequalified DBA providers from which contractors 
can choose.108 The cost of this insurance is allowable and allocable under 
cost-type contracts. 109 
A unique aspect of DBA insurance is coverage for injuries caused by acts 
of war. The War Hazard Compensation Act (WHCA),IIO enacted in 1942, 
provides compensation directly from the coffers of the Government in cases 
of injury or death to employees resulting from a "war-risk hazard."111 Essen-
tially, the Government self-insures when a contractor is injured by an act of 
war. A war-risk hazard is defined in the statute and includes hazards caused 
by the discharging of weapons or explosives by a hostile force,112 the oper-
ation of vessels or aircraft in a zone of hostilities or engaged in wartime ac-
tivities,l13 or any action of a hostile force or person,114 including the deten-
tion of contractors by hostile forces. I IS By relieving insurance carriers from 
the risk of insuring against injuries or death caused by war, the Government 
intended to help contractors obtain DBA insurance at fair premiums. I 16 
In summary, three basic insurance laws are implicated when contractors 
employed by the Government are injured or killed overseas: (1) the 
LHWCA, (2) the DBA, and (3) the WHCA.117 Two other laws, the Mutual 
Security Act of 1954 and the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995, are also impli-
106. See Defense Base Act: Workers' Compensation for Employees of u.s. Government Contractors 
Working Overseas, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwclExplainingDBAhtm 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2012). 
107. 42 U.S.c. § 1651(a)(4); see also Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 
U.S.c. § 932(a)(1)-<2) (2006). 
108. Defense Base Act: Workers' Compensation for Employees of u.s. Government Contractors 
Working Overseas, supra note 106, at 2. 
109. FAR 31.205-19(c), (e)(2)(ii), (e)(2)(v) (2011). 
110. War Hazard Compensation Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1701 (2006). 
111. 20 C.F.R. § 61.100-.101 (2010). Reimbursement for injury or death is paid for with ap-
propriated funds, similar to the payment of claims under the Federal Employees Compensation 
Act (FECA). See Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.c. § 8147(a) (2006). An impor-
tant caveat here is that, in most cases, insurance companies must pay WHCA claims up-front, 
and may only be fully reimbursed if it is later shown that the injury or death was caused by a war-
risk hazard. !d. (For the limited circumstances in which WHCA claims can be paid directly, see 
20 C.F.R. § 61.105.) This system can create an incentive for carriers to initially deny claims. ld. 
112. 42 U.S.c. § 1711(b)(I). 
113. !d. § 1711(b)(5). 
114. !d. § 1711(b)(2). 
115. ld. § 1701. 
116. Jeffrey L. Robb, Workers' Compensation for Defense Contractor Employees Accompanying the 
Armed Forces, 33 PUB. CaNT. L.J. 423, 431 (2004) (citing S. REp. No. 77-1448, at 5 (1942». 
117. Much like FECA, an exclusivity clause in the DBA limits employer liability to that of the 
statute and excludes all other workers' compensation liability imposed by any state or other fed-
eral entity. See 5 U.s.c. § 8173 (2006). Thus, the DBA and accompanying laws provide the only 
recourse for injured contractors. See id. ("This liability is exclusive and instead of all other lia-
bility of the United States ... in a civil action, or in admiralty, or by an administrative or judicial 
proceeding under a workmen's compensation statute or under a Federal tort liability statute."); 
Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1651(c) (2006). 
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cated, but less frequently, as they apply to U.S. contractors under contract 
with foreign governments. IIB Though these statutes have provided a satisfac-
tory framework for protecting injured contractors in the past, the cost of 
DBA insurance has become unacceptably high, as illustrated by the com-
plaints congressional leaders have recently begun examining. 
B. DBA Insurance Concerns: Rising Costs and Denial of Claims 
The above compensation scheme was originally intended to provide 
workers' compensation-type benefits to contractor employees and to limit 
the liability of both the Government and defense contractors. Not surpris-
ingly, Congress's concerns with the scheme today are still economically 
driven, exacerbated by the unprecedented number of claims in the last 
decade. 119 Congress simply never envisioned contractors working so closely 
with military personnel for such protracted periods. It is anachronistic, how-
ever, to think the problems with DBA insurance are limited to issues of cost. 
The denial and delayed processing of medical claims by insurance companies 
have left many contractors without critical care. 120 Sadly, treatment for men-
tal health care has been particularly susceptible to insurance carriers' heavy-
handed denial of claims. 121 
The Government has done a commendable job of creating an insurance 
regulatory scheme for government contractors. The coverage, however, 
comes at a high price. The rise in DBA insurance premiums is the primary 
catalyst for recent congressional action. In The NDAA for 2009 included a 
section in which Congress directed the DoD to address escalating costs of 
DBA insurance. In The DoD undertook a nearly year-long study and 
found that Congress's cost concerns were not unwarranted. 124 The DoD 
found that between 2002 and 2008, the DBA insurance market grew from 
about $18 million to more than $400 million in government premiums. 125 
Comparing war zone and non-war zone premiums, the DoD found that 
war zone premiums were ninety percent higher than non-war zone pre-
miums. The DoD also found that eighty-eight percent of all premiums 
118. See Mutual Security Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-665, 62 Stat. 850 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 22 U.S.c.); Dayton Peace Accords, Nov. 21, 1995, 35 LL.M. 75. 
119. VALERIE BAlLEY GRASSO ET AL., CONGo RESEARCH SERV., RL34670, THE DEFENSE BASE 
ACT (DBA): THE FEDERALLY MANDATED WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR OVERSEAS Gov-
ERNMENT CONTRACTORS 3 (2010). 
120. T. Christian Miller & Doug Smith, Injured War Zone Contractors Fight to Get Care, 
L.A. TL"'ES (Apr. 16, 2009, 10:25 PM), http://articies.latimes.coml2009lapr/17/nationina-
contractors 17. 
121. Id. 
122. Defense Base Act Insurance: Are Taxpayers Paying Too Much?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Oversight & Gov't Reform, IlOth Congo 30 (2008) (statement of Rep. Diane E. Watson) [here-
inafter 2008 House Hearing]. 
123. See Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 110-417, § 843, 122 Stat. 4502, 4540 (2008). 
124. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at ii. 
125. Id. at i. 
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were for prime or subcontracts that had their primary place of performance 
in Iraq and Mghanistan. 126 Perhaps not surprisingly, the high insurance pre-
miums in war zones are a result of four major factors: (1) logistical chal-
lenges; (2) volatility in the workplace; (3) the volume of claims, including 
controverted claims and subsequent litigation; and (4) a lack of competition 
in the DBA insurance business. 127 
The logistical challenges of providing DBA insurance are tremendous. 
Iraq and Mghanistan lack adequate medical facilities, infrastructure, and 
medical resources. 128 Routine injuries may require medical evacuation sim-
ply because the proper facilities or experts are not available. 129 Insurance car-
riers are often required to make reimbursements in different currencies, and 
claims can involve parties or witnesses who speak different languages, have 
different cultural norms, and are thousands of miles apart. 130 Such variables 
result in increased costs, especially when a significant number of overseas 
contractors have absolutely no presence in the United States. 131 
Volatility in the workplace is another factor that creates high premiums. 
DBA insurance involves more than paying benefits to injured workers; it is 
the transferring of risk from employees to employers and insurance carriers. 
Actuaries, employed by insurance carriers, analyze statistical data and use 
mathematical formulas to derive risk probabilities for a multitude of loss sce-
nariosp2 Carriers then use these calculations to set premiums to cover the 
risk and to calculate what assets must be kept in reserve to pay for potential 
10sses.l33 Generally, actuaries must know (1) the chance that an event will 
take place, (2) the amount of loss from the event, (3) the premium for 
each category of policyholder, and (4) the amount that must be kept in 
reserve to pay for the loss when the event occurS.134 If these data are accu-
rate, insurance carriers can spread their risk across insureds in similar risk 
"poOlS"135 so that losses can be shared over time. 
The volatility of workplaces like Iraq and Mghanistan, with unstable gov-
ernments, weak economies, and poor infrastructure, make actuarial calcula-
tions exceptionally difficult. Unlike the domestic workplace, employees 
remain in-country for many months and do not leave their work environ-
ment except when taking leave.136 When employees do take leave, it often 
126. !d. at 34. 
127. See id. at 4-6; supra Part ILB. 
128. See DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 4. 
129. See id. 
130. Id. at 5. 
131. See 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14, at 22 (statement of Seth Harris, Deputy Sec'y, 
Dep't of Labor). 
132. See Michelle E. Boardman, Knuwn Unknuwns: The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance, 93 GEO. 
LJ. 783, 810 (2005). 
133. See id. at 809. 
134. See id. at 813. 
135. See id. at 809. 
136. See generally DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARMY FIELD MANuAL 3-100.21, CONTRACTORS ON THE 
BATTI.EFIELD Gan. 3, 2003). 
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involves a precarious exit from the country.137 This unpredictability makes 
estimating the costs associated with providing DBA insurance extremely 
problematic. 138 Actuaries lack the extensive historical data on losses in 
Iraq and Mghanistan that they do for losses in the domestic insurance mar-
ket,139 as efforts to track injuries have only recently begun.l40 Thus, insur-
ance carriers are likely to either underestimate or overestimate insurance 
premiums. As a result, insurance carriers continue to front-load these risks 
into premiums and insurance rates. 141 
The DoD addressed the issue of excessive industry profits in its 2009 
report to Congress. 142 The report stated plainly that DBA insurers were 
achieving significant underwriting gains. 143 Relying on a 2008 memoran-
dum, the DoD reported that the House Oversight and Government Reform 
Committee had conducted a study and found that AIG had collected more 
than $1.3 billion in premiums but had paid only $500 million in benefits, 
a thirty-eight percent profit margin. l44 Likewise, an Army Audit Agency 
report found that during the period from 2003 to 2005, Kellogg, Brown, 
and Root (KBR) paid $284 million in premiums to AIG, but AIG was pre-
dicted to pay only $73 million for the care of KBR employees.145 It seems 
providers of DBA insurance have protected themselves from volatility by 
keeping premiums high and denying costly claims. 146 
If there is any certainty concerning Iraq and Mghanistan, it is that troop 
movements and rebuilding projects will remain volatile. As rebuilding proj-
ects wane, the civilian workforce will be withdrawn and DBA insurance pre-
miums available to pay claims will decline. 147 Injured contractors, however, 
are often younger than their domestic counterparts and may be entitled to 
13 7. See generally id. 
13S. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 24. 
139. See DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 4. 
140. SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at 4. 
141. Rebecca U. Weiner, The Hidden Costs of Contracting: Private Law, Commercial Im-
peratives and the Privatized Military Industry 22 (Dec. 200S) (unpublished paper), available at 
htrp://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/fileslHidden%20Costs%20of<>1020Contracting_Dec%20200S 
.pdf. 
142. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 6. 
143. !d. 
144. Memorandum from the Majority Staff, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, 110th 
Cong., to Members of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Congo 6 (May 15, 
200S), available at http://abcnews.go.com/images/Blotter/DBA %20hearing%20_ %20200S0 
515102024.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum from the Majority Staff]. 
145. !d. 
146. Despite these findings, the DoD does not place blame for the high cost of DBA insur-
ance on rising profits. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 24. Rather, their report lists a number 
of other factors, including broker commissions, sales and marketing, and other administrative 
costs, as contributing factors. See id. Congress, on the other hand, has expressed greater concern 
over the exorbitant profits. See generally id. This tension is partly what has framed the debate 
between the DoD and Congress on how DBA insurance should be secured in the future. See gen-
erally id. 
147. Miller & Smith, supra note 120. 
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reimbursements for injuries well into the future. 148 For this reason, insur-
ance companies are extremely cognizant of the number and type of claims 
they will pay and the effect of such payments on their revenue after their pre-
mium streams decline. 149 
The rising number of claims has also contributed to higher premiums. In 
2008, the escalating number of claims forced the Division of Longshore and 
Harbors Workers' Compensation (DLHWC), which oversees the process-
ing of all DBA claims, to restructure its claims processing. ISO DLHWC di-
vided all Middle East DBA claims, previously processed through its New 
York City office, among its ninety-seven employees located in eleven differ-
ent district offices.1Sl The increase in the volume of claims has raised costs 
for both industry and the Government. 152 
While the volume of claims has driven premium rates higher, contro-
verted claims and claims in litigation also have contributed to rising rates. 
Under the LHWCA, an insurance carrier (or employer, if the employer is 
self-insured) has fourteen days from the date of notification of the injury 
to make payment to the employee. l53 Given this short period of time, costly 
claims or those involving more complex issues, such as PTSD, are often 
"controverted."IS4 Insurance carriers will typically hire their own experts 
to examine records and documents, even though an employee's physician 
has already made a diagnosis and recommendation for treatment. ISS This sit-
uation usually results in conflicting expert testimony, causing lengthy delays 
in claims processing.156 
Controverted claims involving WHCA reimbursements also have con-
tributed to inefficiencies in the claims processing system resulting in tremen-
dous economic waste. Under the WHCA, insurance carriers are not reim-
bursed for war-risk hazards until the insurance carrier pays the insured's 
DBA claim.1S7 The DOL issued a bulletin to insurance carriers strongly 
148. Id. 
149. See id. 
150. See OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ANNuAL 
REpORT TO CONGRESS FY 2008, at 2-3 (2008), available at http://www.dol.gov/owcp/080 
wcprnx.pdf. 
151. Id. at 31. 
152. See id. at 33. 
153. See 33 U.S.c. §914(b) (2006). 
154. 20 C.F.R. § 702.251 (2011). 
155. See 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14, at 182. 
156. Uncertainty in the U.S. courts of appeals regarding the correct judicial forum for appeals 
under the DBA has only extended the litigation of these claims. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Eleventh Circuits have concluded that appeals should begin in the district courts, while the 
Ninth Circuit has held that appeals from the DOL's administrative process should be heard 
by courts of appeals. See Claire Been, Bypassing Redundancy: Resolving the Jurisdictional Dilemma 
Under the Defense Base Act, 83 WASH. L. REv. 219 (2008); see also Heather Ruhlman, Service Em-
ployees International v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs: Increasing the 
Uncertainty Regarding the Proper Courts for Jurisdictional Review of Claims Under the Defense Base 
Act, 44 CREIGHTON L. REv. 769 (2011). 
157. 20 C.F.R. § 61.101 (2011). 
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recommending that carriers obtain a compensation order delineating the in-
sured's entitlement to benefits, the rate of compensation, and the period of 
payment, even before submitting a WHCA reimbursement request. 15S An 
insurance carrier, therefore, must payor dispute a claim well before a reim-
bursement determination is ever made. This creates an incentive for insur-
ance carriers to deny potential WHCA claims until they can obtain an 
administrative law judge order expressly finding that the injury resulted 
from a war-risk hazard. Once an insurance carrier obtains an ALJ order, it 
can better support its WHCA reimbursement claim. 159 This method of dis-
puting claims wastes government and industry resources and inflates the cost 
of the dispute process. 
Lack of competition also has contributed to increased premiums. In the 
NDAA for 2009, Congress asked the secretary of defense to develop an acqui-
sition strategy for DBA insurance that would minimize costs to the DoD and 
defense contractors and "provide for a competitive marketplace ... to the 
maximum extent practicable."160 Competition, however, has not been a hall-
mark of procuring DBA insurance. In fact, on August 8, 2003, shortly after 
the invasion of Iraq, the DoD solicited proposals to provide DBA insurance 
under a "single-provider" DoD-wide program. 161 The solicitation was left 
open for almost a month, but not a single insurance carrier submitted a 
proposal. 162 
Two other agencies, however, have had more success soliciting single-
provider insurance for their agencies. The DOS and the u.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) have used single-provider programs 
for some time. 163 Under this system, rather than securing their own insur-
ance, contractors are required to use an insurance carrier selected through 
competitive procurement procedures. '64 While this strategy has been suc-
cessful in the past, the DOS and USAID have recently struggled to generate 
competition for DBA insurance contracts. 165 When the DOS and USAID 
most recently issued DBA insurance proposals for their respective agencies, 
only one insurance carrier, CNA, offered a proposal.I66 Single-provider 
competition for DBA insurance for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
158. OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPo PROGRAMS, OWCP BULLETIN No. 05-01, WAR HAzARD 
COMPENSATION ACT-CLAIMS FOR REIMBURSEMENT & DETENTION BENEFIT PROCEDURES (2005), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dfedregs/complianceIDFECFolio/OWCPBulletin05-01. 
pdf. 
159. 20 C.F.R. § 61.101(c) (2011) lists items that must be provided to receive reimbursement. 
160. Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 
110-417, § 843(b)(5), 122 Stat. 4502,4540 (2008). 
161. Vernon Silver, Bloomberg, Bechtel Benefits as Iraq Contractors Struggle to Get Insurance, 
SAN DIEGO SOURCE (Nov. 25, 2003), http://www.sddt.comlNews/articie.cfm?SourceCode= 
20031125faj. 
162. Id. 
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(USACE) met the same result, receiving only one proposal from CNA in a 
recent competition. 167 
Even when contractors secure their own DBA insurance on the open mar-
ket, three major carriers dominate the marketplace. Out of the thirty-two 
carriers that provide DBA insurance, AIG, CNA, and ACE account for 
ninety-seven percent of all the premiums collected. 168 Twenty-nine carriers 
make up the additional three percent. 169 AIG alone accounts for seventy-five 
percent of the total DBA insurance policy premiums.170 Due to lack of com-
petition, a business in which a single company controls the lion's share of the 
market can be very costly. Further, when claims processing problems arise, 
claimants and contracting agencies have a much harder time lobbying for 
changes because of the money and influence on the other side of the debate. 
A second major concern, almost completely overlooked by the Govern-
ment and industry, is that claimants are too often being denied reimburse-
ment for medical treatment. A problem that existed early in the days of 
the Iraq invasion, which unbelievably is still a problem today, is that employ-
ers simply fail to secure DBA insuranceY1 When the Iraq war began in 
March 2003, contractors were woefully ignorant of the DBA's require-
ments. l72 Employees were often sent to work in war zones without workers' 
compensation insurance. 173 The chronicles of contractors' missteps in this 
area in the early days of the Iraq war are ghastly. 174 
The Army was aware that contracts were being awarded without the re-
quired DBA clause because the Defense Acquisition Excellence Council 
briefed the issue at a March 18,2003, council meeting.J75 One of the present-
ers, Alan Chvotkin, specifically informed the council that DBA coverage was 
167. /d. 
168. /d. at 28. 
169. /d. 
170. Id. at 29. 
171. See Susie Dow, Iraq, Contingency Contracting, and the Defense Base Act, EPLURIBUSMEDIA. 
ORG, http://www.epluribusmedia.org/featuresl200712007 03 04_contingency _contracting.html (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2012). 
172. .See id. 
173. See id. 
174. Susie Dow, a contributor for ePluribus Media, maintains a blog documenting the trag-
edy of Kirk Von Ackerman and Ryan Manelick, two former U.S. Air Force officers who were 
killed in Iraq. Susie Dow & Steven Reich, One Missing, One Dead: An Iraq Contractor in the 
Fog of War, EpLURIBUSMEDIA.ORG (May 12, 2006), http://www.epluribusmedia.orglfeatures/ 
2006120060512_missingman_p1.html. The two men were hired to work for Ultra Services, an 
Army contractor in Istanbul, Turkey. Id. On October 9,2003, Von Ackerman left Forward Op-
erating Base (FOB) Pacesetter near Balad, Iraq, and was never seen again. /d. Two months later, 
Ryan Manelick, his co-worker, was shot to death in his vehicle after leaving a meeting at Camp 
Anaconda at Balad Air Base. Id. The Army was not able to determine whether the deaths were 
related. /d. Von Ackerman left behind a wife and three children. Id. After his disappearance, his 
wife filed a claim for compensation under the DBA. Id. However, Ultra Services had not secured 
DBA insurance for Von Ackerman or Manelick. Id. In fact, company executives said they had 
never heard of DBA insurance even though they had collected revenues of more than $12 mil-
lion in government contracts. Id.; see also Dow, mpra note 171. 
175. Michael]. Dudley, Contractors on the Battlefield: Part III, DCMA CO,\1MUNICATOR, Fall 
2004-Winter 2005, at 28, 33. 
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being overlooked and contracts were being awarded without DBA cover-
age. 176 Mr. Chvotkin stated that due to some Contracting Officers' (COs) 
lack of familiarity with DBA requirements, the urgency with which the 
DoD was awarding contracts in Iraq, and confusion over the scope of 
DBA clauses, the DBA clauses were often omitted from many overseas con-
tracts. ln Even after the Army recognized the problem, accurate information 
was still not reaching COs and defense contractors. For example, two years 
later, in November 2005, contractor Wolfpack Security, Inc. denied that it 
was responsible for securing DBA insurance after an injured employee 
incurred $700,000 in medical expenses. 178 
It is difficult to believe that the DoD simply needs more time to commu-
nicate DBA requirements to the field. These requirements have been in 
effect since 1941.179 While contractors' roles have changed since that 
time, contractors have been intimately involved in the war effort since 
Gulf War I in 1991.180 During a June 18,2009, House Committee hearing, 
the former deputy secretary of the Department of Labor flatly stated that 
"the DOL is limited in its ability to guarantee that all employers have the 
necessary insurance as there is no comprehensive system for tracking over-
seas contracts, contractors, and subcontractors, and workers under each con-
tract."181 He went on to say that it is sometimes difficult for the DOL to even 
identify the employer, the prime contractor, and the responsible insurance carrier 
with overseas contracts, and that some contractors simply go without insurance to 
lower their costs. 182 In other words, keeping track of contractors has simply 
confounded the Government. 
Contractors' failure to secure DBA insurance has been further compli-
cated by ambiguities in the DBA and associated statutes. Generally, the lan-
guage in the DBA is broad, covering "any employee engaged in any employ-
ment ... upon any public work in any Territory or possession outside the 
continental United States ... if such employee is engaged in employment 
at such place under the contract of a contractor ... with the United 
176. Dow, supra note 171. 
177. See id. 
178. See T. Christian Miller, Forgotten Warriors: Russell Skoug's Story, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 16, 
2009, 10:25 PM), http://www.propublica.org/articlelforgotten-warriors-russell-skougs-story-
416. On September 11, 2006, Mr. Skoug was ttaveling with an Anny Special Forces unit 
when their convoy ran over an anti-tank mine. Id. Mr. Skoug survived, due in part to his bullet-
proof vest and the annor-plated truck. Id. The president of Wolfpack, Mark Atwood, acknowl-
edged that a number of mistakes had been made with respect to Mr. Skoug's injuries but denied 
his company was required to secure DBA insurance for its employees. Id. Mr. Atwood claimed 
that Wolfpack's contract with the Anny did not require DBA insurance and that the Anny 
should never have allowed Mr. Skoug to travel with an Anny Special Forces convoy. Id. 
179. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39. 
180. See Stephen Lendman, Outsourcing War-Rise of Private Military Contractors (PMCs), 
RENSE.COM (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.rense.comlgeneraI89/outs.htm. 
181. 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14, at 23 (statement of Seth Harris, Deputy Sec'y, Dep't 
of Labor). 
182. Id. 
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States."183 Another clause in particular, however, excludes coverage to any 
contractor or subcontractor "who is engaged exclusively in furnishing mate-
rials or supplies under his contract."184 This limitation serves multiple pur-
poses. First, it excludes manufacturers of goods used overseas.18S Second, it 
removes some of the insurance risk by excluding contractors who move in 
and out of the area of responsibility (AOR).186 Risk for these workers may 
be difficult to determine since the amount of time these contractors spend 
in the AOR, and the areas in which they travel, might vary greatly depending 
on the contract. Further, depending on where they work, many of these 
manufacturers or suppliers may not require DBA insurance. The exclusion 
therefore reduces the overall cost of insurance for the Government. 
This exclusion of supply contractors, however, has created a great deal of 
ambiguity. For example, a contractor might manufacture materials or sup-
plies in the United States but also deliver the supplies to the AOR. Delivery 
of supplies to the AOR might require employees to perform onsite services. 
The contractor would seem to be exempt from DBA requirements as he is 
"exclusively engaged in furnishing material and supplies,"187 but employees 
making deliveries to the AOR or performing onsite services might bring the 
contractor within the scope of the statute. The nuances in the law are diffi-
cult enough for U.S. contractors to comprehend, let alone less sophisticated 
second- and third-tier contractors who may have no familiarity with U.S. 
law. 
Further complicating the matter, DoD agencies seem to disagree on when 
DBA insurance is required. 188 In an effort to explain the exception to the 
clause, former Director for Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy 
Deidre A. Lee issued a memorandum to the directors of the defense 
agencies, explicitly stating that the DBA clause should be included in all 
DoD service contracts performed (either entirely or in part) outside of the 
183. Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1651(a)(3) (2006). 
184. Id. 
185. See Alan-Howard v. Todd Logistics, Inc., 21 Ben. Rev. Bd. Servo (MB) 70, 72-73 (1988). 
In this case, the Board held that the administrative assistant's claim for injury was cognizable 
under the DBA since the U.S. undertaking to aid in the construction of a military facility for 
Saudi Arabia qualified as the "public work" required for coverage under the DBA. Id. Further-
more, the DBA exclusion from coverage of "any employee of ... [aJ contractor ... who is 
engaged exclusively in furnishing materials or supplies under his contract" was held not to 
apply since the claimant's work as a facilitator under his employer's contract to provide "logistics 
management and support services" constituted a "service." Id. Specifically, the Board viewed the 
pertinent exclusionary language as excluding manufacturers of goods used overseas from DBA 
coverage, rather than individuals who work onsite to facilitate the utilization of such goods. Id. 
186. See Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1651. 
187. Id. § 1651(a)(3). 
188. See USACE Defense Base Act Insurance Program, Workers Compo I7lS. Program Rules & Reg-
ulations, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, http://www.tam.usace.arrny.miVDocumentslIndustry 
DayDocslDefense-Base-Act-Insurance.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2012) (U.S. Army Corps of En-
gineers explicitly requires DBA insurance unless a waiver is obtained). But see OFFICE OF TIlE 
AsSISTANT SEC'y OF THE ARMY, ARMY CONfRACroRS ACCOMPANYING TIlE FORCE GUIDEBOOK 18 
(2003), tlVailable at http://www.alt.arrny.miVportal/pageiportal/oasaaltidocurnentslcaf...guidebook. 
doc (stating that DBA insurance "is available" in some instances). 
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United States, as well as in all supply contracts that also require the peiformance of 
employee services overseas. 189 The authority Ms. Lee cited for this expansive 
reading of the DBA rests on the broad definition of the term "public-work 
contract" in FAR 28.305. 190 The memorandum essentially dispenses with 
the "service" versus "supply" distinction that the exemption language in 
the statute seems to impose. 191 
A 2005 GAO report was critical of the DoD's confusing guidance related 
to the applicability of DBA insurance.t92 The GAO found that some 
agencies believed DBA insurance waivers issued by the DOL exempted con-
tractors working in Iraq from carrying DBA insurance. 193 DOL officials, 
however, confirmed that waivers do not apply to contractors in Iraq because 
the country lacks its own local workers' compensation system. 194 The report 
also raised questions about what benefits would be provided when grant 
workers purchase DBA insurance, since the DOL position is that DBA re-
quirements do not cover work performed under grants. 195 Lastly, the report 
raised concerns over whether DBA insurance would be required for mixed-
funding contracts involving appropriated funds of the United States and 
funds from foreign governments. 196 
The DBA clause's lack of clarity may have reduced the Government's 
willingness to impose sanctions on contractors failing to secure DBA insur-
ance. The DOL and the Department of Justice's (DO]) refusal to enforce 
DBA laws has done nothing to raise awareness of the importance of DBA 
insurance. Criminal and civil penalties are available to the Government 
when contractors either fail to obtain DBA insurance or fail to comply 
with the DOL's administrative processing regulations. 197 The Government, 
however, has no incentive to impose these sanctions and has only rarely 
elected to do so. The DOL may impose civil fines in the amount of 
$10,000 against an employer, insurance carrier, or self-insured employer 
who knowingly and willfully fails to notify the DOL when an employee is 
injured and the injury causes the employee to miss one or more shifts 
from work. 198 Likewise, the DOL may impose civil penalties on contractors 
who make false statements in their DOL reports. 199 Between 2001 and 2009, 
189. Memorandum from Deidre A. Lee, Director, Def. Procurement & Acquisition Policy, 
Office of the Under Sec'y of Def., to the Directors of the Def. Agencies (Dec. 8, 2003), available 
at https:llwww.alt.army.millportal/page/portalloasaaltldocuments/dpap_memo_08dec03.pdf 
(emphasis added). 
190. See id. 
191. See id. 
192. See U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-OS -280R, DEFENSE BASE ACT INSURANCE: 
REVIEW NEEDED OF COST AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 5 (2005). 
193. See id. 
194.Id. 
195. Id. 
196. See id. 
197. 20 C.F.R. § 702.204 (2011). 
198. Id. § 702.201 (2011). 
199. Id. § 702.204. 
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however, the DOL only fined five companies, even though DOL records 
showed at least 7,000 cases where companies had failed to report injuries.2oo 
As of June 2009, the DOL reported levying fines in only about 50 of the 
36,000 cases processed by the two largest insurance companies.201 
Criminal sanctions are also authorized under the LHWCA, yet no one has 
ever been prosecuted. When contractor conduct triggers the possibility of crim-
inal penalties, the LHWCA requires the DOL to alert the DO] as the DO] 
maintains prosecutorial discretion.202 The LHWCA's language is clear and 
expansive in terms of imposing criIninal penalties on companies and individual 
company officers.203 The section states that employers failing to obtain DBA 
insurance, when required, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and may be fined 
up to $10,000 and imprisoned for up to a year, or both.204 Additionally, the sec-
tion provides that in cases where such an employer is a corporation, the presi-
dent, secretary, and treasurer shall be severally liable for the corporation's fail-
ure to secure DBA insurance.205 In fact, the statute provides that the president, 
secretary, and treasurer shall be "severally personally liable, jointly with such 
corporation, for any compensation or other benefit which may accrue under 
the said Act in respect to any injury which may occur to any employee of 
such corporation .... "206 This broad language suggests that Congress wanted 
to ensure that contractor employees were adequately covered under the DBA. 
Given the severe consequences, one would expect that they would deter con-
tractors from failing to provide DBA insurance. In the nearly eighty-five-year 
history of the LHWCA, however, no one has ever been prosecuted.207 
Even when contractors do secure DBA insurance, carriers still deny liabil-
ity for many claims related to PTSD and other serious injuries. There is no 
question that the regulatory scheme has been overburdened by a heightened 
reliance on contractors.20B This excuse, however, fails to justify the delay and 
denial of mental health claims. Critics of the current DBA regulatory scheme 
argue that the DOL does not have the necessary authority to properly over-
see the compensation system and, therefore, has limited ability to correct the 
delay and denial of mental health claims under DBA insurance.209 
The statistics for mental health DBA claims are dismal. Three insurance 
carriers account for approximately ninety-seven percent of the DBA pre-
miums paid by the DoD.21O AIG accounts for approximately seventy-five 
200. See T. Christian Miller, Injured Abroad, Neglected at HlJ'I1te: Labor Dept. Slow to Help War 
Zone Contractors, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.propublica.org/articlellabor-dept-
slow-to-enforce-defense-base-act-for-contractor-care-1217. 
201. See id. 
202. Id. 
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percent, while CNA and ACE Group account for approximately fourteen 
percent and seven percent, respectively.211 However, these numbers are 
somewhat misleading. Chris Winans, a spokesman for AIG, said his com-
pany pays about half of the claims involving PTSD.212 A joint investigation 
by the Los Angeles Times, ABC News, and ProPublica found that when inju-
ries resulted in more than four days of lost work, insurance carriers also paid 
claims in only about half the cases.213 
The media have helped raise awareness about the denial of mental health 
claims.214 Because insurance carriers rarely confront significant conse-
quences for such denials, however, an exorbitant number of injured contrac-
tors must challenge their carriers' refusal to pay their claims.215 The hard-
ship imposed on contractors when their claims are denied is an important 
part of the debate surrounding DBA insurance.216 Any alternative for a 
new acquisition strategy must provide the DOL with more oversight author-
ity; otherwise, insurance carriers will continue to exploit injured contractors. 
III. DEVELOPING A NEW ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
A. Policy Changes Could Alleviate Existing Problems 
The acquisition process must be reformed. But before making any statu-
tory changes, Congress should consider whether policy changes would 
alleviate its cost concerns. Three particular policy considerations should 
be addressed. First, the DoD should consider the benefits associated with 
211. Id. 
212. Risen, supra note 10. 
213. See Miller & Smith, supra note 120. 
214. See Russell Goldman, How Iraq Contractors Deal with Trauma, ABC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2007), 
http://abcnews.go.comlUS/story?id=3679866&page=1; see also Miller, supra note 200; Max Pi-
zarro, One Widow's Drive to End the War, CLATL.COM (Jan. 24, 1007), http://clad.comladanta/ 
one-widows-drive-to-end-the-war/Content?oid=1265285 [hereinafter Pizarro, Drive to End the 
War]. The investigation by the Los Angeles Times, ABC News, and ProPublica highlighted the 
accounts of three contractors, Alice Davis, John Mancini, and Tim Eysselinck, who were denied 
reimbursement for mental health treatment. Alice Davis was hired by DynCorp International to 
train police officers in Iraq. Goldman, supra. As a result of her exposure to dead bodies, children 
without limbs, and life-threatening situations, Ms. Davis developed seizures. Id. DynCorp re-
commended she seek mental health treatment, but their insurance carrier refused to reimburse 
her treatment. Id. John Mancini was hit by an SUV on his way home from Kuwait City. His 
employer had failed to secure DBA insurance. Miller, supra note 200. Mr. Mancini sought reim-
bursement for his medical bills for two years through DOL, without success. Id. On October 6, 
2006, Mr. Mancini was arrested after making several calls to the police and shooting a gun at 
officers when they arrived at his house. ld. He was sentenced to ten years in an Arizona 
mental hospital, followed by treatment through the Arizona correctional system. Id. Lasdy, 
Tim Eysselinck, a forty-four-year-old contractor employee for RONCO Consulting Corpora-
tion (RONCO), was hired to provide land mine and explosive ordnance removal services. 
Pizarro, Drive to End the War, supra. On April 21, 2004, Tim Eysselinck shot himself while 
on leave with his wife and daughter in Africa after celebrating his forty-fourth birthday. /d. 
His employer denied the family's DBA claim, stating that Mr. Eysse!inck's suicide was unrelated 
to his de-mining duties in Iraq. ld. 
215. See Memorandum from the Majority Staff, supra note 144, at 15. 
216. See Milligan, supra note 100, at 416-17. 
660 Public Contract Law Journal • Vol. 41, No.3· Spring 2012 
paying a reasonable amount of money for DBA insurance. Second, if the cost 
associated with maintaining a healthy contactor workforce is too high, Con-
gress should consider whether civilian contractors should be working in war 
zones at all. Third, if contractors are needed in war zones, the DoD should 
consider enforcing existing regulations to reduce the cost of DBA insurance. 
Insuring contractors in war zones is costly.217 Although Congress wants 
to reduce the cost of DBA insurance, it must consider that paying too little 
for insurance might circumvent a number of important goals. First, the qual-
ity of service provided by insurance carriers is already reaching unacceptable 
levels for mental health claims.2ls Reducing costs before these issues are re-
solved will only exacerbate the problems. Second, the law requires contrac-
tors to provide for the health and safety of their employees at the work 
site.219 Since the Government reimburses contractors for insurance pre-
miums, it is reasonable that the Government should be concerned with ben-
efits distribution. If insurance companies are denying claims and reaping 
excessive profits, then the Government is complicit in circumventing the 
DBA. Third, the Government must provide for a safe working environment 
to keep contractors from straying from the Government's objectives. Like 
insurance carriers, contractor employees are agents of the Government. If 
employees are not receiving reimbursement for care, their families' financial 
security is at risk.220 A contractor in this position will always put his or her 
own objectives over the objectives of the Government. Thus, before any 
cheaper means of securing DBA benefits is implemented, Congress must 
realize that DBA insurance is costly and that paying less for insurance is 
not necessarily in the best interest of the Government. 
If cost is Congress's primary concern-as the NDAA for 2009 seems to 
suggest-then the Government should consider relying less on civilians in 
war zones. Simply stated, the Government should not send civilians to war 
zones if they are not willing to pay the costs associated with ensuring their 
safety. No matter what acquisition strategy is used, the cost of insuring 
against risk to contractors in war zones will be costly. If Congress has 
decided that the United States can no longer afford these costs, then perhaps 
the work should be left to the U.S. military. Ordinarily, the Government 
would use its military to perform hazardous tasks. Yet because of the person-
nellimits imposed by Congress, much of the risk of performing services and 
construction in war zones has been allocated to contractors.221 It is simply 
not acceptable that Congress take any action that threatens the safety of 
217. See U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, mpra note 192, at 3-4. 
218. See Goldman, mpra note 214. 
219. See Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1651(a)(4) (2006). 
220. See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., PUB. No. 09-POll, MENTAL HEALTH: REsEARCH FINDINGS 5 (2009). 
221. See CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR DEPLOYED MILITARY FORCES 2-5 
(2005), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocsl67xx1doc6794/1O-20-MilitaryLogisticsSupport.pdf. 
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contractors after they have borne the responsibilities the DoD has placed on 
them. Ill-equipping the warfighter because of cost concerns should never be an 
acceptable solution, regardless of whether the warfighter is enlisted, commissioned, 
or under contract with the U.S. Government. 
Lastly, a new acquisition strategy will not necessarily alleviate existing 
problems or decrease costs unless current regulations are enforced. Better 
enforcement of existing regulations is a low-cost solution, which requires 
no implementation. Criminal penalties are already available under the 
LHWCA if contractors fail to secure DBA insurance.222 Further, the 
DOL has the authority to levy fines when contractors fail to purchase 
DBA-required insurance223 and the DO] has the authority to prosecute 
and imprison delinquent contractors.224 Although these remedies are avail-
able, few fines have ever been assessed and no one has ever been prosecuted 
for failing to carry DBA insurance.225 If the Government used these reme-
dies, it would at least improve contractor compliance with the law, and per-
haps send a stronger message regarding the importance of DBA insurance. 
Another mechanism already in place that could be used to monitor DBA 
compliance is the CO's responsibility determination. The FAR mandates 
that no contract shall be awarded unless the CO makes an affirmative deter-
mination of responsibility.226 While these determinations typically involve a 
contractor's financial stability, the clause states that contractors must be 
"otherwise qualified and eligible to receive an award."227 Since failing to 
secure DBA insurance carries criminal penalties, it would seem the clause 
is broad enough to allow COs to find contractors nonresponsible when 
they fail to secure DBA insurance. 
Given the DBA clause's broad language, it also seems reasonable that the 
responsibility determination could be used to ensure that contractor employ-
ees are physically capable of performing contract requirements. The military 
imposes rigorous physical standards.228 It makes sense that their civilian 
counterparts, who often work closely with the military, are also physically 
prepared for the operational hazards of their jobs. 
Requiring contractors to maintain fitness standards could provide a num-
ber of advantages to insurance carriers and the Government. First, with a 
healthier pool of claimants, the number of claims, as well as the cost of 
each claim, might be reduced. Second, liability might be clearer with claim-
ants who have fewer preexisting conditions, thus reducing litigation costs. 
222. 33 U.S.c. § 938(a) (2006). 
223. 20 C.F.R. § 702.201 (2011). 
224. 33 U.S.c. § 938(a). 
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Overall, requiring contractors to provide employees that are physically capa-
ble of performing their jobs would likely make insuring these workers less 
risky and less costly. 
Although enforcing existing regulations would improve efficiency, the 
breadth of available remedies is somewhat limited. The Government may 
only impose sanctions or penalties authorized under the DBA and associated 
statutes.229 While the sanctions are significant, they are limited to compli-
ance failures-situations in which the contractor failed to obtain insur-
ance.230 The sanctions do not directly address cost and performance con-' 
cerns.231 Further, because the Government has no privity of contract with 
insurance carriers, its remedies against carrier malfeasance are limited to 
those provided by the statute. Employers may seek remedies for breach of 
contract against insurance carriers when their employees' claims are denied, 
but they have no incentive to do so. Therefore, absent action from either the 
Government or their employers, contractor employees are left with only lim-
ited procedural remedies against insurance carriers. 
In summary, the DoD must accept that there are costs associated with 
keeping contractors safe overseas. If the cost is too high, then perhaps civi-
lians should be removed from the front lines. If contractors are needed in 
war zones, then the Government should make a more valiant effort to 
enforce current regulations. While the Government still needs to implement 
improved acquisition strategies for DBA insurance, enforcement of current 
regulations will improve efficiency, will provide better care for contractors, 
and may even slow the rising number of contractor casualties. 
B. Single-Provider Insurance versus Open-Market Insurance: 
A Forty-Year Debate 
The Government has been pursuing DBA insurance reform since the 
1970s, when the GAO released two reports expressing their concern over 
the cost and implementation of DBA insurance.232 Since that time, the 
debate has mainly focused on whether the DoD would realize greater cost 
savings by implementing a single-insurer program, such as the DOS and 
the USAID programs,233 or through improvements to the current open-
229. See Jeffrey L. Robb, The Future of Competitive Sourcing: Workers' Compensation for Defense 
Contractor Employees Accompanying the Armed Forces, 33 PUB. Com. L.J. 423, 425 n.18, 426 n.24 
(2004) (noting that the DBA incorporates the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation 
Act as a statute of general reference and that under the LHWCA, an employer who fails to 
secure the payment of compensation is guilty of a misdemeanor offense) (citing 33 U.S.c. 
§ 938(a) (2000». 
230. See 33 U.S.c. § 938(a) (2006). 
231. See id. 
232. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-I72699, OPPORTUNITY FOR SAVINGS IN PROVID-
ING WAR RISK INSURANCE FOR CONfRACTOR PROPERTY AND EMPLOYEES (1971), available 
at http://archive.gao.gov/ID302l095484.pdf; see also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
B-162408, AID NEEDS CLARIFICATION ON DEFENSE BASE ACT INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS 
(1980), available at http://archive.gao.gov/ID202l113660.pdf. 
233. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 7. 
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market program. In 1996, the DoD completed a congressionally mandated 
study, similar to DoD's most recent DBA report to Congress, on the issue 
of implementing a single-provider program to provide DBA insurance for 
all DoD contracts.234 At the time, the DoD concluded that a single-provider 
program would not yield greater cost savings.235 The Government rested on 
those findings until 2005, when smaller federal agencies, such as the DOS 
and USAID, began realizing cost savings using single-provider programs. 
The debate between Congress and the DoD over DBA acquisition proce-
dures subsequently intensified. 
In 2005, the GAO performed a comprehensive study of DBA insurance and 
found that both the DOS and USAID were realizing cost savings through fixed 
insurance rates under single-provider contracts. 236 At the same time, the cost of 
DBA insurance on the open market was steadily rising and the DoD was experi-
encing unprecedented cost increases.237 In April 2005, in response to requests 
from over 100 members of Congress, the GAO issued a report on rising costs 
and other problems associated with DBA insurance.238 The crux of the report 
was whether greater savings could be obtained from a single-provider or an 
open-market provider system.239 The GAO found that contractors working 
for the DOS and USAID paid insurance premiums ranging from $2 to $5 for 
DBA insurance for every $100 of salary cost-regardless of where the contract 
was performed.240 In contrast, DoD insurance premiums ranged from $10 to 
$21 per $100 of salary cost for contracts performed in Iraq.241 The GAO con-
cluded that while singe-provider programs appeared to be more cost-efficient, 
further information was needed to determine whether the DoD could achieve 
the same rates and savings as the DOS and USAID given the locations in 
which it operates.242 
The GAO also cited multiple problems with the DoD's administration of 
DBA insurance, preventing a conclusion as to whether a single-provider 
strategy would result in costs similar to those experienced by the DOS 
and USAID.243 The GAO found that the DoD experienced problems with 
(1) determining when DBA insurance applies, (2) providing adequate and 
accurate information to companies and workers, (3) monitoring contractor 
compliance with DBA requirements, (4) processing claims, and (5) handling 
the increased claims volume.244 The GAO concluded that an informed deci-
234. See U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNfABILITY OFFICE, supra note 192, at 5. 
235. See id. 
236. See id. 
237. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 3. 
238. See U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNfABILITY OFFICE, supra note 192, at 5. 
239. See id. at 4. 
240. DBA insurance costs are typically compared in terms of dollars per $100 of payroll cost. 
241. See U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNfABILITY OFFICE, supra note 192, at 4. The GAO contacted eight 
prime contractors who reported these rates. 
242. See id. at 5. 
243. See generally id. 
244. See id. 
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sion about a procurement strategy for DBA insurance could not be made 
until these shortcomings were corrected.245 Further, the GAO recom-
mended that the DoD, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the 
DOL, the DOS, and USAID conduct a joint study in order to gather as 
much data as possible on DBA insurance and to determine which acquisition 
strategy would be most effective across the agencies.246 
Both the OMB and the DoD objected to the recommendation. The OMB be-
lieved that efforts to rectify the problems were already in place. 247lt cited the for-
mation of an interagency working group, DOL seminars on DBA insurance, a 
proposed DOS rule regarding D BAinsurance waivers, and an ongoing pilot pro-
gram to test the efficiency of single-provider insurance for the DoD.248 The 
OMB also stated that the GAO's recommendation was too broad and that a "tar-
geted approach to DBA issues would be preferable .... "249 
Likewise, the DoD stated that the cost of such a study would outweigh 
any potential benefits.250 The DoD added that the cost of DBA data collec-
tion and reporting would be expensive and divert already limited resources, 
with no clear benefit for the procurement process.251 The DoD recom-
mended waiting to see if the working group, seminars, conferences, and 
pilot program could achieve their desired results before undertaking any fur-
ther studies.252 
Despite the DoD's reluctance, Congress directed the DoD to examine 
reform strategies for DBA insurance in its National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2006.253 Two years later, the DoD still had not acted 
on Congress's request.254 During a May 2008 House Oversight and Govern-
ment Reform Committee hearing, the Committee railed against Admiral 
Richard Ginman (Ret. U.S. Navy), Deputy Director for Contingency 
Contracting and Acquisition Policy, for not being able to provide answers 
to simple and germane questions.255 
The Committee asked Admiral Ginman and other senior officials at DoD 
and DOL (1) how many contractors and subcontractors are in Iraq,256 
(2) how much the DoD pays to insure them/57 (3) if all contractors in 
Iraq require DBA insurance/58 (4) how insurance rates are determined, 
245. See id. at 6. 
246. See id. 
247. See id. 
248. !d. at 9. 
249. !d. 
250. Id. at 11. 
251. Id. 
252. !d. 
253. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, 119 
Stat. 3136 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.c.). 
254. GRASSO ET AL., supra note 119, at 18. 
255. See 2008 House Hearing, supra note 122, at 92. 
256. !d. at 100. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. 
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and (5) how much contractors pay for DBA insurance.259 Surprisingly, none 
of the officials had responses to any of these questions. 
The Committee also asked why the DoD had not reported on the success 
or failure of the USACE single-provider pilot program.260 In 2005, the DoD 
implemented a single-provider pilot program for USACE to test the possi-
bility of using a single DBA insurance provider for all DoD contracts.261 
After the first six months of the pilot, cost savings exceeded $19 million.262 
In October 2008, the program was expanded to include contracts issued by 
the Joint Contracting Command-IraqlMghanistan (JCC-IA).263 During the 
House Committee hearing, Congressman Jim Cooper264 asked why the 
DoD had not reported on the success of the program.265 Admiral Ginman 
stated that the DoD had incomplete data on the program because it had 
been expanded for use by the JCC-IA. 266 The Committee could not under-
stand why, after preliminary data had shown a cost savings of $19 million, 
the DoD had not reported on the program or moved to adopt the acquisition 
strategy for the DoD.267 
In contrast to the success of the pilot program, the House Committee also 
addressed allegations regarding abuses under the DoD's open-market sys-
tem.268 The Committee focused its questioning on the Army's Logistics 
Civil Augmentation Program III (LOGCAP III).269 LOGCAP III was an 
immense Army contract performed exclusively by KBR.270 KBR had secured 
DBA insurance from AlG under the DoD's open-market system.271 VVhen 
the KBR contract came under the scrutiny of the U.S. Army Audit Agency 
(USAAA), USAAA found that KBR was paying "substantially more" in pre-
miums than AlG was expected to pay in claims.272 Like most contracts re-
quiring DBA insurance, KBR's premiums were reimbursable under a cost-
type contract.273 Army auditors found that $284.3 million in DBA premiums 
was paid under the LOGCAP III contract between 2003 and 2005, but only 
$73.1 million was paid in DBA claims for that period.274 Senator Waxman 
noted that between 2002 and 2007, the top four DBA insurers, who provided 
for ninety-nine percent of the DBA insurance at that time, collected $1.5 
259. !d. 
260. Id. at 99. 
261. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 7. 
262. GRASSO ET AL., supra note 119, at 13. 
263. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 7. 
264. Congressman Cooper (Democrat, Tennessee) has served from 2003 to the present. 
265. 2008 House Hearing, supra note 122, at 99. 
266. Id. at 92. 
267. Id. 
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273. See 2008 House Hearing, supra note 122, at 89. 
274.Id. 
666 Public Contract Law Journal e Vol. 41, No.3 e Spring 2012 
billion in premiums and were expected to payout an estimated $928 million 
in claims and expenses.275 Waxman noted that the thirty-nine percent profit 
margin yielded an expected underwriting gain of $585 million for the four 
carriers.276 
Weary of the DoD's inaction, Congress eventually mandated that the 
DoD adopt a new DBA acquisition strategy in 2008.277 Section 843 of the 
NDAA for 2009 requires the DoD to adopt a strategy that would minimize 
costs to both the DoD and defense contractors.278 Unfortunately, Congress 
did not begin to formally investigate claims-processing concerns and 
improper claims denial allegations until after the NOAA for 2009 passed.279 
Perhaps this explains why the NDAA for 2009 does not mention perfor-
mance or claims-processing standards and focuses entirely on minimizing 
costs to the Government and defense contractors. In any case, the House 
Committee finally addressed allegations that insurance companies were im-
properly denying claims at the June 2009 hearing.28o In addition to testi-
mony from wounded contractor veterans, Vice President Major General 
George R. Fay (Ret. U.S. Army Reserve), a CNA executive, and Mr. Gary 
Pitts, an attorney representing thousands of injured contractors, also pro-
vided testimony.28I Several of the witnesses' recommendations were in-
cluded as possible acquisition strategies in the DoD's 2009 report to Con-
gress; however, none of the recommendations were ultimately supported 
by the OoD.282 
IV. ACQUISITION STRATEGIES 
A. Maintaining the Current Open-Market System 
In compliance with the NDAA for 2009 mandate, the DoD submitted a 
report to Congress in September 2009 on reform strategies for DBA insur-
ance.283 The purpose of the report was to propose to Congress an acquisi-
tion strategy that would minimize costs to the Government and defense con-
tractors.284 Since the 2008 House Committee hearings, Congress had been 
awaiting the DoD's recommendation regarding whether the USACE pro-
gram could be implemented DoD-wide.285 While the DoD had asked 
USAAA to conduct a formal audit of the USACE program prior to the 
275. ]d. at 89. 
276. ]d. 
277. See Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 110-417, §843, 122 Stat. 4502, 4540 (2008). 
278. ]d. 
279. See generally 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14. 
280. See generally id. 
281. ld. at 129-30 (statement of General Fay) and 124-25 (statement of Mr. Pitts). 
282. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 13. 
283. 1d. at 1. 
284. See id. 
285. ld. at i. 
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2008 House Committee hearings,286 USAAA did not complete the audit 
until August 2010, after the DoD submitted its report. 287 
Without the Army audit, the DoD collected and presented its own data 
from industry and various government agencies. 288 They presented four 
basic alternative acquisition systems to Congress: (1) a single-provider sys-
tem, (2) a multiple-provider system, (3) an open-market system with im-
provements, and (4) a government self-insurance system.289 Private industry 
clearly favored the current open-market strategy.290 Industry comments ex-
pressed the belief that a single-provider system would not achieve the cost 
savings experienced by USACE.291 The DoD agreed, making its final rec-
ommendation to continue the current open-market strategy, with the addi-
tion of some improvements to the system.292 While the DoD evaluated the 
government self-insurance option favorably, it concluded self-insurance was 
not a workable alternative because the DoD and the DOL lacked the statu-
tory authority or resources to undertake its implementation.293 
Unfortunately, making minor changes to the current open-market strat-
egy will not reduce costs or result in more equitable claims processing. 
The current system, even with the modifications suggested by the DoD, 
will continue to result in excessive premiums for contractors and the Gov-
ernment and processing problems for injured contractors. Instead, the solu-
tion that offers the most cost savings and provides critical monitoring and 
bonding294 of insurance carriers is a multiple-provider system. A brief ana-
lysis of each of the four alternatives is presented below, including a discus-
sion of why a multiple-provider system is the optimum solution for all stake-
holders, including insurance carriers. 
286. See 2008 House Hearing, supra note 122, at 40 (statement of Richard Ginman, Deputy 
Director of Contingency Contracting & Acquisition Policy). 
287. Most USAAA audit reports are available on USAAA's website, http://www.hqda.army. 
miVaaaweb/; however, the USACE pilot-program audit has not been made available as of the 
date of this article. 
288. See DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 11 (DoD collected data from private 
industry, including brokers, insurers, and government contractors, as well as government 
agencies). 
289. !d. at 39. 
290. !d. at 17. 
291. Id. 
292. Id. at 52. 
293. !d. at 57. 
294. See Christopher R. Yukins, A Versatile Prism: Assessing Procurement Law Through the Prin-
cipal-Agent Model, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 63 (2010). Professor Yukins uses the terms "monitoring" 
and "bonding" to describe principle-agent relationships in the context of government contracts. 
!d. at 65-66. Monitoring is essentially oversight by a principal used to eliminate an agent's di-
versions from the principal's objectives. Id. Bonding is the use of contractual self-constraints, 
such as internal policies, practices, or procedures, designed to reduce diversions. !d. at 66. In 
the context of DBA insurance, the Government's objective is to improve reimbursement services 
to injured contractors and decrease costs. See, e.g., DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 
i-iii. Achieving this goal is dependent upon the Government's ability to effectively monitor and 
bond insurance carriers through its contractual relationship with insurance carriers. 
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B. Single-Provider System: An Impracticable Alternative 
A number of government agencies have had success with single-provider 
insurance in the last decade. The DOS, USAID, and USACE have all ben-
efited from switching from an open-market system-which requires contrac-
tors to obtain DBA insurance independently-to a single-provider system, in 
which one insurance company contracts with a government agency to pro-
vide all DBA insurance.295 In the early 1990s, an investigation by the 
DOS inspector general (IG) found that costs could be saved if the DOS tran-
sitioned to a single-provider system.296 Since that time, DOS has competi-
tively awarded DBA insurance contracts to a single carrier.297 USAID and, 
to some extent, USACE have had similar success with this strategy.298 
A single-payer system for the DoD, however, is an impracticable option 
for several reasons. First, single-provider insurance would not meet Con-
gress's requirement to maintain a competitive DBA insurance market. In 
its mandate to the DoD, Congress listed a number of factors that it consid-
ered essential to the adoption of a new strategy, including providing a com-
petitive marketplace for insurance to the maximum extent practicable.299 
Although single-provider insurance would be competitively awarded, all of 
the DoD's business would go to one provider. Thus, Congress would 
never seriously consider such a system. 
Second, no one insurance carrier has the infrastructure to support an 
organization the size of the DoD. While carriers have insured large govern-
ment agencies in the past, the DoD is unique. The DoD has approximately 
2.1 million military and civilian employees,300 compared to the DOS's 
60,000 employees301 and USAID's 2,200 employees.302 In addition to the 
armed forces, the DoD includes the Defense Commissary Agency, the 
Defense Financing and Accounting Service, the Defense Logistics Agency, 
and the Defense Information Systems Agency, among other agencies. 303 
Based on its enormity, it is unlikely that anyone carrier has the administra-
tive and financial resources to be the DoD's sole insurance provider. 
Third, the risks associated with providing DBA insurance to an organiza-
tion with the DoD's mission is not likely to be borne by one insurance car-
rier. While the DOS and USAID conduct missions all over the world, 
295. See supra Part IV.B. 
296. See GRASSO ET AL., supra note 119, at 12. 
297. DoD REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 7. 
298. See supra Part IV.B. 
299. Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 
110-417, § 843(b)(5), 122 Stat. 4502, 4540 (2008). 
300. About the Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., http://www.defense.gov/ 
about (last visited Mar. 5, 2012). 
301. Mission, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://careers.state.govllearnlwhat-we-do/mission 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2011). 
302. Ken Dilanian, Short-Staffed USAID Tries to Keep Pace, USA TODAY (Feb. 1,2009), http:// 
www.usatoday.comlnews/washingtonl2009-02-01-aid-inside_N.htm. 
303. Department of Defense (DOD), USA.GOV, http://www.usa.gov/AgencieslFederallExecutivei 
Defense.shtml (last visited Mar. 5, 2012). 
Defense Base Act Insurance 669 
neither of those departments houses the armed forces. The risks associated 
with insuring military contractors are higher than those associated with sup-
porting the DOS and USAID.J04 Although carriers have collected more 
claims data in the last decade, they remain wary of the DBA insurance mar-
ket. JOS In the DoD's report to Congress, carriers were obviously reticent 
regarding whether they would compete for a single-provider contract. J06 
The DoD reported that "one of the largest DBA carriers ... would entertain 
the possibility of bidding on a single-provider contract."307 Two other insur-
ance carriers indicated that they would not compete.308 
Recent competition for DBA contracts has attracted fewer insurance car-
riers than in the past. After initial success with an award to CIGNA Property 
and Casualty Insurance (CIGNA) in 1991, the DOS solicited a similar follow-
on multiyear contract in 2000.309 Four insurance carriers submitted proposals, 
including CIGNA, AID, Ace International, and CNA.310 CNA was eventually 
awarded the contract.311 In 2008, however, when both the DOS and USAID 
issued solicitations for a single provider of DBA insurance, the only company 
to submit an offer was CNA.312 Likewise, in 2005, the DoD-sponsored pilot 
program for USACE received only one offer, also from CNA.313 Thus, it is 
seriously questionable whether competition for a single-provider contract 
would attract enough competition to satisfy Congress. 
C. Multiple-Provider System: Taking Control of DBA Insurance 
During the House Committee hearings in June 2009, the Committee 
heard testimony from the executive vice president of CNA, General 
Fay.314 CNA had been the sole insurance provider for DOS since 2001 
and for USAID since 2005.315 Based on his experience in public service 
and as vice president of CNA, General Fay recommended that the DoD 
adopt, with modifications, a single-provider program similar to those uti-
lized by the DOS and USAID.316 To compensate for the problems asso-
ciated with insuring an organization of the DoD's size, he recommended se-
parating the DoD into divisions, each with its own single provider of DBA 
insurance.317 By dividing the DoD by department or agency groupings, divi-
304. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 18. 
305. Id. at 4-5 Oisting problems related to the DBA insurance market in comparison with 
stateside workers' compensation). 
306. Id. at 17. 
307. Id. 
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313. See GRASSO ET AL., supra note 119, at 12. 
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316. Id. (statement of General George Fay, Executive Vice President of CNA). 
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sions could be created that are small enough to be homogenous and support-
able by a single provider, yet large enough to diversify the volatility of 
risks. 3lB This network of multiple providers offers a number of advantages 
to industry and government. 
1. Privity of Contract 
A multiple-provider system would create pnvIty of contract between 
insurance carriers and the Government, giving the Government greater con-
trol over the DBA insurance process. The current system can too easily be 
manipulated to the detriment of claimants and the Government. Because 
contractors secure DBA insurance on the open market, privity of contract ex-
ists only between contractors and insurance carriers. Contractors have little 
incentive to negotiate for more competitive rates because their costs are ulti-
mately reimbursed by the Government. 31 9 Furthermore, the Government 
cannot effectively monitor claims processing due to its lack of authority 
over the claims process. While the DOL provides some monitoring function 
in the dispute process, they have no authority to override decisions of insur-
ance carriers.32o Thus, when disputes arise between claimants and carriers, 
the outcome is fortuitous. Claimants receive no assistance from their em-
ployers because their employer is either disputing the claim itself or is not 
interested in challenging the insurance carrier. Only after the case winds 
its way through the administrative dispute labyrinth can claimants obtain 
relief. 321 In other words, the current open-market system has a high poten-
tial for abuse and offers few remedies when cost or perfonnance problems 
arise with insurance carriers. 
On the other hand, if privity of contract existed between insurance car-
riers and government agencies, the Government would be afforded advan-
tages in both contract formation and perfonnance. During contract fonna-
tion, competition among offerors would keep premium rates down, as 
would effective negotiating by government agencies. 322 But even more im-
portantly, government agencies would have discretion to award contracts 
based on past performance and customer satisfaction metrics. 323 This 
could be a tremendous boon for claimants, whose fate has thus far been 
dependent on the sophistication and vigilance of their employers in securing 
quality insurance. Finally, by directly contracting with insurance carriers, 
COs could make responsibility determinations based on whether carriers 
318. 1d. 
319. See GRASSO ET AL., supra note 119, at 15 (2010). 
320. 1d. at 10. 
321. See id. (describing the three-step formal appeals process as well as the optional informal 
resolution process). 
322. See 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14, at 138 (statement of General George Fay, Exec-
utive Vice President of CNA). 
323. See, e.g., FAR 9.2. 
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have in fact obtained DBA insurance-a potentially potent preventative 
mechanism. 
While the contract formation process would allow the Government to 
achieve cost and quality assurance objectives, the monitoring and bonding 
inherent in the performance of government contracts would ensure fulfill-
ment of carriers' obligations. For example, privity of contract would entitle 
the Government to all the remedy-granting clauses available under the 
FAR.324 Thus, insurance carriers would always have an incentive to properly 
pay claims to avoid default. 325 If the insurance carrier was improperly deny-
ing claims, the CO could not only have the option of defaulting the contrac-
tor for failure to perform,326 but could also document the carrier's poor per-
formance in the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information 
System (FAPIIS), a government database that tracks companies' past perfor-
mance.327 These negative performance reports could have serious conse-
quences regarding a contractor's future opportunities with the U.S. Govern-
ment. In summary, a multiple provider system would give the Government 
greater control over the claims process by providing remedies to keep insur-
ance carriers aligned with government objectives. Unlike the DOL's dispute 
process, this system has the capability to correct inefficiencies and avoid 
abuses that exploit injured contractors. 
2. Potential for Cost Savings 
There is general disagreement among stakeholders, including the DoD, 
the insurance industry, and contractors, regarding the potential for cost sav-
ings under any of the alternatives. The DOS, USAID, and USACE have all 
adopted the single-provider system and have experienced cost savings.328 
VVhile the DoD is too large for a single-provider system, the multiple-provider 
system offers many of the same features. There are two clear cost advantages 
if the DoD implements a multiple-provider system. First, a multiple-
provider system would not require minimum premium payments that con-
tractors are required to pay under an open-market system.329 Under an 
open-market system, insurance premiums are paid as a percentage of total 
payroll, such as $10 per $100 of payroll.330 Insurance carriers, however, 
sometimes require contractors with a small number of employees or limited 
payrolls to make minimum premium payments in addition to, or instead of, a 
percentage of their payroll.331 VVhile this may not sound like a significant 
amount of money, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee 
324. FAR 49.402-2. 
325. Id.; see also FAR 52.249-8. 
326. FAR 52.249-8(a)(1)(i). 
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found forty-seven contractors that paid more in insurance premiums than they 
paid in salaries.H2 
Second, the Government would have some control over premium rates 
through the negotiated procurement process. Rates are currently nego-
tiated between contractors and insurance carriers, usually with the assis-
tance of a broker.H3 The Government reimburses contractors under 
cost-type contracts regardless of how much carriers charge, so there is 
no incentive for brokers to negotiate lower rates.334 Overall, a multiple-
provider system would allow the Government to curb excess costs in the 
system, such as eliminating minimum premium charges, and maintain con-
trol over the rates carriers charge through the use of more aggressive nego-
tiating tactics. 
3. Competition 
One final advantage that is integral to the multiple-provider system is the 
guarantee of DBA insurance for all contractors. In the current open-market 
system, fledgling contractors are often unable to secure DBA insurance due 
to their risk.H5 Thus, they are not able to compete for government contracts, 
reducing overall competition in the procurement process. A multiple-provider 
system manages risky contractors through risk "pooling."H6 Pooling allows an 
insurer to pool the risks of multiple contractors so that risks can be spread 
across all contractors in the pool.337 This system results in lower premiums 
and allows all contractors to obtain DBA insurance regardless of their 
risk.338 Under an open-market system, since contractors obtain insurance 
individually, the benefits of risk pooling are not as direct. 
The multiple-provider solution therefore offers enhancements far supe-
rior to the current DBA strategy. Nevertheless, additional components, 
beyond monitoring and bonding, are necessary to crystallize protections 
for contractor veterans returning from war. 
332. 1d. Since 2002, over 700 contractors have been required to make minimum premium 
payments amounting to about $8.5 million. 
333. See id. at 4-6. 
334. See, e.g., id. at 8. 
335. See SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. MG. RECONSTRUCTION, SIGAR AUDIT 11-15, CONfRACT 
PERFORMANCE AND OVERSIGHTIDEFENSE BASE ACT INSURANCE: WEAKNESS IN THE USACE 
DEFENSE BASE ACT INSURANCE PROGRAM LED TO AS MUCH AS $58.5 MILLION IN REFUNDS NOT 
RETURNED TO THE U.S. GoVERNMENf AND OTHER PROBLEMS 2,23 Ouly 28,2011), available at 
http://www.sigar.miVpdflaudits/SIGAR%20Audit-II-15.pdf; GRASSO ET AL., supra note 119, 
at 12,26; DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 40,55. 
336. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 1.3, at 12-13 (West 1988); 
Memorandum from the Majority Staff, supra note 144, at 8-9. 
337. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 336; see also, e.g., Memorandum from the Majority 
Staff, supra note 144, at 8-9. 
338. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 336; GRASSO ET AL., supra note 119, at 26; Memoran-
dum from the Majority Staff, supra note 144, at 8-9. 
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4. Additional Protections for Contractors 
The multiple-provider system allows the Government to properly moni-
tor and bond insurance carriers during contract formation and contract per-
formance. Such controls will result in reasonable premium rates and proper 
claims processing. Three additional components, however, must be imple-
mented to specifically target the denial of complex claims-a problem that 
has scourged the system. First, DOL district directors should have the 
authority to issue binding decisions during the informal dispute resolution 
process. Second, the Government must self-insure against the risk of 
PTSD and TBI. Third, the fourteen-day rule for payment of claims should 
be extended to allow insurance carriers adequate time to investigate complex 
claims. 
Many of the problems experienced by injured contractors are a result of 
financial hardships imposed on claimants when their claims are denied and 
delayed during the dispute process.339 A subtle change in the allocation of 
risk between contractors and insurance carriers, however, would eliminate 
this problem. Presently, district directors can only make nonbinding recom-
mendations to the parties.340 Naturally, when carriers receive an adverse rec-
ommendation, they simply ignore it.341 Thus, the process expends the time 
and resources of the Government, claimants, and insurance carriers without 
bringing any resolution to the case. 
In contrast, allowing district directors to make binding decisions brings 
greater equity and efficiency to the process without sacrificing the rights 
of the parties to appeal their case to OWCP administrative law judges. 
Industry experts have admitted that carriers are denying claims simply to 
gain more time to investigate.342 Binding decisions would help reduce the 
misuse of the system and eliminate prolonged appeals meant to delay the 
decision-making process.343 
A second critical tool to protect contractors suffering from mental illness 
is government self-insurance for PTSD and TBI cases. On June 18, 2009, 
the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee held a hearing 
to address their concerns about PTSD and TBI. 344 Mr. Gary Pitts, an attor-
ney for PTSD and TBI claimants, made four recommendations to the Com-
mittee: (1) increase funding and personnel in the Office of Administrative 
Law Judges, (2) allow contractors with PTSD to receive treatment from 
the Veterans Administration (VA), (3) require insurance carriers to notify 
339. See GRASSO ET AL., supra note 119, at 24; Memorandum from the Majority Staff, supra 
note 144, at 2, 14-15. 
340. See DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 54. 
341. See id. 
342. See 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14, at 25. 
343. This particular recommendation was supported by DoD in its report to Congress. 
Strangely, the recommendation was not formally offered for adoption, as DoD considered im-
provements to the efficiency of the DBA program to be outside the scope of their charter pur-
suant to section 843 of the NDAA for 2009. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 54. 
344. See generally 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14. 
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widows of their right to file claims on behalf of their spouses, and (4) give 
administrative law judges the power to assess a ten percent penalty for insur-
ance carriers filing frivolous defenses to contractor claims. 345 
All of Mr. Pitts' recommendations would be valuable additions to the 
claims process. But his suggestion to have the VA treat civilians with 
PTSD is simply unattainable due to insurmountable political and adminis-
trative hurdles. The VA is so overwhelmed with military veterans from the 
wars of the last two decades346 that putting such a strain on the system 
could be catastrophic. Nevertheless, Mr. Pitts' premise is quite perceptive. 
The cost of litigating PTSD can often surpass the cost of providing treat-
ment. 347 The situation is ripe for a reallocation of risk. If carriers cannot 
accept liability for these claims, it is only reasonable for the Government 
to self-insure. 
Government self-insurance offers a number of benefits to DBA stake-
holders. First, the Government could ensure proper processing of PTSD 
claims. Second, insurance carriers, who lack critical data on contractor inju-
ries related to PTSD, would be relieved of any liability for such claims. 
Third, lower premiums could be negotiated in exchange for the reduction 
of carrier risk. Lastly, business opportunities would abound, as carriers 
would still playa role in the administration of these claims for the Govern-
ment. If insurance carriers cannot manage the risk associated with mental 
health claims, then it is clear that the risk should be reallocated. Government 
self-insurance would safeguard injured contractors from mistreatment and 
would save the Government valuable resources by removing the transactions 
costs associated with disputing liability. 
A third and final component to address the problem of carriers denying 
complex claims is an extension of the fourteen-day period in which insurance 
carriers are expected to pay claims.348 Although the rule was intended to 
speed the processing of claims, it has created an incentive for carriers to 
do the exact opposite. The current industry practice is to deny complex 
claims to buy time for carriers and employers to investigate.349 The pro-
posed time extension is a reasonable one, provided it does not prevent claim-
ants from paying medical bills, rent, mortgage, and other monthly family 
obligations. 
345. 1d. at 124-25. 
346. See, e.g., DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT OF VETER-
ANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION TRANsmON AsSISTANCE FOR OPERATIONS ENDURING AND IRAQI 
FREEDOM SERVICE MEMBERS AND VETERANS, REpORT No. 06-03552-169 GULY 200S); U.S. 
GoV'T ACCOUNTAIlILITY OFFICE, GAO-OS-473T, VETERANS' DISABILITY BENEFITS: VETERANS' 
DISABILITY BENEFITS CLAIMS PROCESSING CHALLENGES PERSIST, WHILE VA CONTINUES TO 
TAKE STEPS TO ADDRESS THEM (200S); U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-OS-901, 
VETERANS' DISABILITY BENEFITS: BETTER ACCOUNTABILITY AND ACCESS WOULD OOROVE THE 
BENEFITS DELIVERY AT DISCHARGE PROGRAM (200S). 
347. See 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14, at 127. 
34S. 20 C.F.R. § 702.232 (2011). 
349. See 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14, at 25. 
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In summary, while a multiple-provider solution provides greater control 
over the processing of DBA claims, a reallocation of risk is crucial in 
order to protect the rights of contractor veterans in complex claims cases. 
District directors must be given the authority to issue binding decisions. 
Government self-insurance for PTSD and TBI cases is essential if Congress 
is at all interested in providing relief to claimants and their families. Finally, 
due to the complexity of certain DBA claims, the fourteen-day rule should be 
extended, when appropriate, to give insurance carriers adequate time to 
investigate claims. These changes should be paramount to the budget and 
fiscal concerns that have dominated the acquisition strategy discussions to 
date. 
5. Outcomes versus Costs 
Government officials have been concerned about the costs associated with 
the open-market strategy since the 1970s,350 yet the DoD has resisted any 
deviation from the current open-market system.351 Between 2003 and 
2005 as DBA insurance costs were escalating, USAAA audit reports found 
that the Army's LOGCAP contracts, which all secure DBA insurance on 
the open market, had "substantial" underwriting gains and multiple DBA 
compliance failures. 352 In 2007, an analysis by the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) concluded that the risk-pooling approach of the single- and 
multiple-provider systems could lower the DoD's DBA insurance costs by 
as much as $362 million over a ten-year period.353 And finally, USACE 
reportedly experienced cost savings in the first six months of the DoD-
sponsored single-provider pilot program of $19 million.354 Yet, in its 2009 
report to Congress, the DoD ignored these findings and insisted that the 
current strategy is the most inexpensive way to secure DBA insurance.355 
The bottom line is that no stakeholder has been able to demonstrate with 
any certainty that one alternative would yield greater cost savings than 
another alternative. Congress argues that the rising cost of DBA insurance 
has been a concern for forty years.356 They rely on GAO reports and 
USAAA audit reports to support their conclusion that reform is needed.357 
The DoD relies on data in its 2009 congressional report to tout the benefits 
of the current open-market strategy.358 This difference in perspective is pre-
cisely why the debate must focus more on system outcomes rather than costs. 
Congress and the DoD should be engaged in a cost-benefit analysi~ rather 
350. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 192, at 4. 
351. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Majority Staff, supra note 144, at 10. But see, e.g., DoD 
REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 7 (DoD piloted a non-open-market program). 
352. See GRASSO ET AL., supra note 119, at IS, 20. 
353. Memorandum from the Majority Staff, supra note 144, at 12. 
354. Id. at II. 
355. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at ii. 
356. U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 192, at 4. 
357. See Memorandum from the Majority Staff, supra note 144, at 9, 12. 
35S. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at ii. 
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than limiting the debate to conflicting cost studies. The fact that there are so 
many uncertainties regarding whether any particular system would result in 
savings to the Government further bolsters the argument that outcomes 
must be given greater weight in the decision-making process. 
Many of the benefits of a multiple-provider system have been discussed. 
Foremost on this list is the contractual remedies that would be available if 
carriers continued to exploit injured contractors. The Government has a 
moral and legal obligation to protect its contractor veterans.359 It is uncon-
scionable that contractors have been treated as collateral damage. By imple-
menting a multiple-provider system, the Government could more closely 
monitor insurance carriers to make sure claims are processed appropriately. 
A multiple-provider system would also allow all contractors to compete on 
equal footing in the acquisition arena. Rather than being denied DBA cov-
erage and foreclosed from competition, every contractor, regardless of 
size, would be able to obtain DBA insurance at comparable rates. Thus, 
the system fulfills Congress's requirement for maximizing competition. Con-
gress has long sought to change the way DBA insurance is procured.36o The 
discussion should be expanded, however, to include a cost-benefit analysis in 
addition to the current cost-saving discussion. 
D. Maintaining the Status Quo 
The DoD recommends keeping the current open-market strategy but makes 
four suggestions for improving the system.361 These include (1) making loss 
data accessible to all D BAcarriers, (2) creating contractor risk pools for contrac-
tors unable to obtain DBA insurance, (3) requiring carriers to separate DBA 
insurance pricing from other types of insurance, and (4) establishing a single 
DoD contact for country-specific D BAinsurance waivers. 362 The DoD consid-
ered the cost savings of a government self-insurance approach in its report to 
Congress but dismissed the approach because of the time required for imple-
mentation.363 While the DoD's suggestions seem to be aimed at bringing 
more transparency to the process, the impact of such changes would do little 
to resolve the cost and claims-processing problems under the current system. 
The DoD has used the open-market strategy since the advent of DBA 
insurance in 1941.364 Under this system, contractors secure their own DBA 
insurance from a list of approved carriers maintained by the DOL.365 Con-
359. See, e.g., Mutual Security Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-477, § 502, 72 Stat. 261, 272 
(amending the DBA (42 U.s.c. § 1651) to apply to service contracts by adding a new subpara-
graph (5) to subsection (1 )(a». 
360. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, 
§ 1041, 119 Stat. 3136, 3430 (2006) (Congress directed the Department of Defense to examine 
the best way to procure DBA insurance). 
361. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 54. 
362. See id. 
363. See id. 
364. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Majority Staff, supra note 144, at 4. 
365. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 7. 
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tractors may also self-insure if they have the financial means to do so and have 
been approved by the DOL.366 Proponents claim the free-market approach is 
the best means available to control costs.367 Insurance carriers compete for 
DBA insurance business in the open market, which, in theory, allows contrac-
tors to obtain the best possible premium rates. 368 
There are, however, major drawbacks to an open-market strategy. The 
Government does not maintain privity of contract with insurance carriers, 
which leaves the Government with fewer remedies when carriers stray 
from the Government's objectives.369 The DOL oversees but is not respon-
sible for processing DBA claims and has little authority over insurance car-
riers.37o Injured contractors disputing claims must await the final decision of 
OWCP administrative law judges before obtaining relief, which can take 
months or years.37l Further, the Government has no authority over pre-
miums negotiated between contractors and insurance carriers even though 
the Government pays the costs. 372 And, while premium rates may be 
lower in some cases, the open-market system has recently seen uncontrolla-
ble rises in cost, excessive profits by carriers, and unacceptably high denial 
rates for PTSD claims.373 Due to these concerns, the current strategy falls 
short of stakeholders' moral and statutory obligations to contractor veterans, 
even with the improvements suggested by the DoD. 
On the other hand, the DoD's recommendation to make loss data acces-
sible to all DBA carriers in a nationwide database should be implemented, as 
it would help carriers better understand DBA risks and provide greater 
transparency in the acquisition process. Such an improvement, however, 
does not resolve Congress's immediate cost and claims-processing concerns. 
The DoD has increasingly relied on contractors since the beginning of the 
Persian Gulf War in 1991.374 Three insurance carriers have provided 
ninety-seven percent of the DBA insurance to these contractors: (1) AlG, 
(2) CNA, and (3) ACE Group.375 These carriers "contend that the early 
years [of war] in Iraq and Mghanistan were novel situations and that 
366. See id. A contractor may self-insure either by taking steps to financially prepare for losses 
on their own or by establishing a legally licensed insurance company, known as a "captive 
insurer." Id. Eight employers are listed by DOL as self-insured. See Division of Longshore and 
Harbor Workers' Compensation (DLHWC), U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/owcp/ 
dlhwc!lscarrier.htm#authorized self-insured employers (last visited Mar. 8, 2012) (listing eight 
employers as self-insured for DBA). 
367. See, e.g., DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 19. 
368. See, e.g., id. at 38. 
369. See supra Part IV.C.l. 
370. See supra Part II.B. 
371. See id. 
372. See supra Part IV.C.l. 
373. See supra Part IILA. 
374. James P. Terry, Privatizing Defense Support Operations: The Need to Improve DoD's Over-
sight and Management, ARMED FORCES & SOC'y 660 (2010), available at http://afs.sagepub.coml 
contentI36/4/660.full.pdf+html. 
375. DoD REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 28. 
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premiums have declined because carriers now have a better understanding of 
the nature of the hazards in those regions."376 
While it is true that these three carriers have been able to collect claims 
data for the last two decades, cost and claims-processing problems have 
not been reduced.377 USAAA audit reports and GAO reports in the last 
five years have found rising DBA costs and wild fluctuations in insurance 
rates. 378 Thus, sharing claims data will not resolve the current problems. 
Perhaps it is the nature of wartime contracting that makes the risk so unpre-
dictable: each conflict depends greatly on geographical, political, military, 
social, and economic factors. A national DBA claims database is surely an 
improvement over individual carriers tracking claims. Data collected by 
the major DBA insurers, however, have not yet resulted in decreased costs 
of DBA insurance.379 
The DoD also suggests creating contractor risk pools that would require 
larger insurers to provide insurance to high-risk contractors who cannot oth-
erwise obtain insurance on their own.380 This improvement attempts to mir-
ror a multiple-provider system that uses risk pools to provide coverage to all 
contractors. Under an open-market system, however, there is no way to 
guarantee that riskier contractors will be offered fair-market rates. Unlike 
a multiple-provider system, where government agencies would negotiate 
rates for all contractors in the risk pool, the Government could not control 
the premiums charged to high-risk contractors. This recommendation 
would therefore not result in the same type of leveling for high-risk contrac- . 
tors that would result under a multiple-provider system. 
The DoD also suggests mandating that insurers do not bundle DBA cov-
erage with other insurance coverage and identifying a single point of contact 
for the DBA waiver process.381 Neither suggestion would correct current 
cost and claims-processing issues. Since the majority of insurers do not fol-
low the practice of bundling DBA insurance with other coverage, such as 
accidental death or kidnap and ransom insurance, the recommendation 
does little to bring resolution to current acquisition problems.382 Further, 
a single DoD point of contact for waivers would have little or no impact 
on the problems at hand. Waivers affect a small number of contractors, as 
they are only granted for foreign nationals and only if acceptable workers' 
compensation benefits are provided by applicable local law. 383 Thus, this 
recommendation would do little to solve current cost and claims-processing 
Issues. 
376. See id. at 19. 
377. See GRASSO ET AL., supra note 119, at B. 
37B. See id. at lB. 
379. See id. 
380. See DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 55. 
3B1. See id. at 56. 
382. See id. The DoD identified one insurer that bundled DBA insurance coverage with other 
insurance coverage. See id. 
383. Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1651(e) (2006). 
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In summary, the DoD's recommendation to keep the status quo, with the 
exception of four cosmetic changes to the system, is a paltry attempt to assist 
injured contractors or to address serious congressional concerns. Sharing 
claims loss data may bring more transparency to the process. The data col-
lected by AIG, however, which provides seventy-five percent of DBA insur-
ance business, certainly has not helped that company lower premiums. Risk 
pooling would resolve the problem of carriers refusing to insure risky con-
tractors, but the Government has no way of guaranteeing reasonable rates 
for those contractors. Waivers and transparency in pricing would improve 
the acquisition system, but again these improvements do not address Con-
gress's immediate concerns. Thus, adopting the DoD's recommendation 
does almost nothing to resolve cost and claims-processing issues. 
E. Government Self-Insurance: An Ideal Alternative 
A multiple-provider system would provide many advantages to both the 
Government and private industry and can be implemented using the existing 
statutory framework for DBA insurance. An ideal alternative, however, and 
one that has garnered at least moderate support from Congress and indus-
try384 is government self-insurance. Self-insurance offers perhaps the great-
est system for distribution of benefits to injured contractors, as well as the 
highest potential for cost savings. One caveat is that this option would 
require significant changes to existing DBA statutes and would therefore 
take time to implement.385 Thus, Congress should continue researching 
implementation of this alternative and, if the data are supportive, begin tak-
ing steps to execute transition. 
Insurance companies are an essential component of risk management. In 
the volatile business of DBA insurance, however, carriers must often insure 
against risk with inadequate data and under unpredictable circumstances.386 
Given these conditions, carriers charge higher premiums to cover a broader 
range of potential liability, resulting in higher costs for the Government. 387 
In government contracting, agencies avoid this situation by allocating risk to 
the Government.388 This way, contractors are able to calculate their costs 
and submit offers to the Government without having to adjust for unknown 
risk.389 Self-insurance achieves this goal by shifting the risk from insur-
ance carriers-who have had trouble calculating their risk in Iraq and 
Afghanistan-to the Government.390 Private industry supports this sys-
tem because insurance carriers would be in the best position to offer 
384. DoD REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 52; see also 2008 House Hearing, supra note 
122, at 97. 
385. See DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 54. DoD estimates it would take at 
least three years to implement government self-insurance. 
386. See supra Part IV.D. 
387. See id. 
388. Weiner, supra note 141, at 23. 
389. See Boardman, supra note 132, at 833. 
390. See DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 20. 
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third-party administration of the system by capitalizing on their unique 
infrastructure.391 Thus, because of the uncertainty of risk involved in pro-
viding DBA insurance, self-insurance offers an appropriate allocation of 
risk for the parties while preserving business opportunities for private 
industry. 
Many of Congress's claims-processing concerns can be alleviated through 
this shifting of risk. By employing a third-party administrator who is not lia-
ble for the claims they process, the Government removes any impartiality or 
business incentive to deny claims. Fees for administrators would be gener-
ated on a per-case basis irrespective of acceptance or denial of liability and 
would likely reduce problems associated with improper denial of claims. If 
the Government did encounter problems with denial of claims, it could 
address the issue directly with the administrator and realign processing 
with the Government's objectives. The administrator would be under con-
tract with the Government and therefore would be monitored using all the 
contractual remedies provided to the Government under the FAR. Thus, 
even if the administrator strayed from the Government's objectives, govern-
ment oversight inherent in the government acquisition system would allow 
for correction of any problems. 
Another benefit to claimants and carriers alike would be the elimination 
of WHCA determinations. As mentioned above, carriers often deny claims 
until an administrative law judge finds that an employee's injury resulted 
from a war-risk hazard.392 This bifurcation of claims processing for war-
risk hazards and non-war-risk hazards claims has caused claimants immea-
surable hardship.393 Self-insurance would eliminate the bifurcation of claims 
and lessen the needless suffering of contractor veterans. 
One final benefit of self-insurance is that it achieves a greater emphasis on 
contractor safety. Acting as the primary insurer for DBA benefits, the Gov-
ernment would be remiss to not place considerable weight on contractor 
safety. As both a past performance and an award fee evaluation factor, the 
Government would likely put a high premium on contractors' risk manage-
ment performance and safety records.394 Contractors would surely pay more 
attention to safety if they expected COs to closely scrutinize such data. 
In addition to the benefits claimants would realize under self-insurance, 
Congress, the DoD, and private industry all agree that the system has a 
high potential for cost savings.395 Under this system, the Government 
391. Private industry has shown support for third-party administration of a government self-
insurance system, and obviously favors the option over government-run insurance, whereby the 
Government would act as its own administrator. See id. at 19. Still, some critics argue the system 
results in a net loss of private business. See id. However, companies previously unable to absorb 
the liability would now be able to participate as administrators. See id. Thus, the benefit of in-
creasing industry participation is likely to offset any negative effect. See id. 
392. See 20 C.F.R. § 61.101 (2011); OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPo PROGRAMS, supra note 158. 
393. See DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 3. 
394. Id. at 43. 
395. Id. at 19. 
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pays workers' compensation claims much the same way it pays federal civil-
ian employees' claims. Injured workers file claims with the Government, 
which then pays claims without relying on a third-party insurer.396 Self-
insurance eliminates the role of insurance carriers as agents of the Govern-
ment, and thus avoids the excess monitoring and bonding costs of single- or 
multiple-provider systems. 
Removing the "middle man" offers notable benefits to stakeholders. First, 
DBA premiums would be eliminated completely. Contractors would no 
longer include DBA insurance as a direct cost of their contracts. Second, 
the Government would not pay administrative or other indirect fees that 
are typically appended to insurance premiums. All fees other than those 
going to the claimant and the third-party administrator would be eliminated, 
including. broker commissions, sales and marketing costs, and profit. 397 
Thus, the difference between the cost to compensate injured workers and 
the cost of actual losses would be significantly less than under any other 
insurance system. Further, since costs incurred would predominantly come 
from the reimbursement of actual losses, the Government would not be 
affected by financial markets or other financial factors affecting the insurance 
industry. Overall, the Government would retain greater control over the cost 
of DBA insurance under this system. 
Despite these benefits, there are a number of arguments against govern-
ment self-insurance. The greatest of these concerns is the time it would 
take to implement the system. The threat of "bigger government" would 
unquestionably draw furious debate from political and industry opponents. 
Concerns over funding for Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and even 
the Postal Service raise questions about government management of reim-
bursement programs. Time, however, should hardly be considered an 
impediment. More discourse on the topic should be encouraged, as such 
democratic discussions would only bring more transparency to the process. 
Congress and the DoD, eminently concerned with costs, would benefit from 
public opinion on more important matters such as coverage for contractors 
suffering from PTSD and TBI. Moreover, as long as the DoD adopted a 
multiple-provider system during the interim period, there would be no 
harm in waiting for Congress to pass legislation making the Government 
more accountable for injured workers. 
Other than time, opponents have struggled to articulate why self-insurance 
would not be an ideal system. Critics have argued that if contractors are no 
longer required to obtain their own insurance, they are less likely to provide 
a safe workplace.398 Based on the discussion above, this argument lacks 
merit. 399 On the contrary, contractors would be much more safety-focused 
396. 5 U.S.c. § 8147(a) (2006). 
397. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 43. 
398. Id. at 19. 
399. See supra Part rv.E. 
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if the Government was self-insuring, as contractor safety records would 
receive greater scrutiny.400 
Opponents also argue that because of the unknown risks associated with 
DBA insurance, self-insurance might create Anti-Deficiency Act issues.401 
These concerns are warranted. Nevertheless, the Government should be 
able to accurately estimate the cost of DBA claims using DBA claims data 
from the DoL, as well as data from the recently implemented SPOT sys-
tem.402 Additionally, the Government has been in the business of insuring 
employees for some time, and the system has never created Anti-Deficiency 
Act problems. For example, the Government maintains the Federal Employ-
ees' Compensation Fund, which pays workers' compensation claims to fed-
eral civilian employees.403 Each year, the secretary of labor provides the 
OMB with an estimated cost so that the necessary monies can be appro-
priated.404 Each government agency employing injured civilians assists the 
secretary in collecting claims data by submitting the total cost of benefits 
paid from FECA during the preceding year.405 Agencies then request 
funds equal to the estimated cost of claims to be paid for the following 
year.406 Through this statutorily mandated process, the Government has 
avoided running afoul of the Anti-Deficiency Act.407 A very similar process 
could be imposed and managed by a third-party administrator. The admin-
istrator would collect claims data from contractors and pass the information 
on to the Government. This is just one example of how the Government 
could avoid violating fiscal law. 
Finally, critics argue that self-insurance goes against Congress's mandate 
for the DoD to adopt an acquisition strategy that promotes competition in 
the insurance marketplace.408 Quite the contrary, Congress, the DoD, and 
the insurance industry, including some brokers,409 are interested in self-
insurance because it provides a unique business opportunity for insurance 
carriers. The DoD employs more than 718,000 civilian personne1.410 
Managing the claims of these employees would provide an incredible reve-
nue stream for any insurance carrier. Carriers already have the infrastructure 
in place to perform claims processing for large government agencies. And, 
without being required to accept the risk of insuring contractors overseas, 
business would be relatively consistent and predictable. The House Over-
400. See id. 
401. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, mpra note 39, at 19. 
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Defense Base Act Insurance 683 
sight and Government Refonn Committee noted that CNA experienced 
losses of about $15 million between 2002 and 2007 on contracts with 
DOS, USAlD, and USACE.411 By removing the underwriting risk and capi-
talizing on the infrastructure and services that insurance carriers can provide 
to the Government, carriers could develop a very profitable industry. Con-
gress's requirement for competition in the marketplace would certainly be 
met by awarding contracts for these services through the government con-
tract process. 
Overall, the arguments against self-insurance do not carry much weight. 
If, as stakeholders say, self-insurance is simply a matter of time, then the 
Government should begin taking immediate steps to move the proper legis-
lation through Congress. 
v. CONCLUSION: THE WAY AHEAD 
All DBA stakeholders recognize the benefits of government self-insur-
ance.412 But until Congress has an opportunity to develop a strategy for im-
plementing self-insurance, a multiple-provider acquisition strategy offers the 
best interim solution. Transitioning to a multiple-provider system would not 
require extensive statutory change and could be implemented in a relatively 
short period of time. Procuring the services of multiple carriers to provide 
insurance to agencies or divisions within the DoD is already achievable. 
Furthennore, a multiple-provider system would offer several key benefits 
that would pave the way for government self-insurance. First, and most im-
portantly, a multiple-provider system would provide privity of contract with 
insurance carriers. This contractual relationship would allow government 
agencies to retain control over the claims process and would infuse much-
needed accountability into the DBA insurance system. Additionally, granting 
DOL district directors the authority to issue binding decisions would elim-
inate the financial strain on injured contractors and their families during the 
appeals process. Self-insuring against the risk of PTSD and TBI would save 
the Government and other stakeholders valuable resources currently wasted 
on needless litigation. It would put the risk of insuring against mental illness 
on the Government, and would restore accountability in a system that has-
for the last decade-facilitated the profiteering of wounded Americans. 
In summary, the way in which the United States fights wars has changed 
over the last two decades. If the United States wishes to continue its reliance 
on overseas contractors, then it must recognize its moral obligation to the 
men and women sacrificing their lives to support our armed forces. It is 
shameful that contractors seeking treatment for mental illness due to roadside 
bombs and improvised explosive devices are turned away by insurance carriers. 
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Sending civilians into war has consequences, but those consequences 
should not be borne by the children and spouses of our contractor veterans. 
After nearly forty years, Congress has finally mandated adoption of a new 
acquisition strategy. It is astounding that the DoD has suggested maintain-
ing the same open-market strategy that will continue to exploit wounded 
Americans serving in Iraq and Mghanistan. While keeping the status quo 
may be the simplest solution, it betrays the age-old military ethos that no 
American should ever be left behind. 
